California Western Law Review
Volume 22

Number 2

Article 6

1986

West Covina and Its Progeny: Have the California Courts
Barricaded the Avenue of Relief Provided for Victims of Hospital
Corporate Negligence?
Lisa R. Rohm

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr

Recommended Citation
Rohm, Lisa R. (1986) "West Covina and Its Progeny: Have the California Courts Barricaded the Avenue of
Relief Provided for Victims of Hospital Corporate Negligence?," California Western Law Review: Vol. 22 :
No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol22/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu.

Rohm: West Covina and Its Progeny: Have the California Courts Barricade

West Covina and Its Progeny: Have the California
Courts Barricaded the Avenue of Relief
Provided for Victims of Hospital
Corporate Negligence?
INTRODUCTION

Historically, hospitals have been comprised of two separate
groups.' Hospital administration has been on the one side: responsible only for financial and housekeeping services. On the other side
has been the medical personnel, having the responsibility of supplying medical services. This traditional distinction between the responsibilities of the physician and the hospital was, until recently,
interpreted by the courts as a limitation on the hospital for the negligent acts of its staff physicians. 2 Hospitals-whether charitable or
for profit-were regarded as mere collections of facilities and man-3
power and, as such, were for the most part immune from suits.
Staff physicians were considered independent contractors and thus
assumed the sole responsibility for the consequences of their actions. This view has changed in the last decade and will continue to
4
change.
1. For an excellent discussion of the changing responsibilities of hospitals, see
Southwick, The Hospitalas an Institution-ExpandingResponsibilitiesChange Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. RPv. 429 (1973).

2. A "staff physician" is a private doctor who has been granted medical staff privileges by a hospital to treat his patients in that particular hospital. A physician granted
staff privileges at a hospital may admit patients for clinical testing, for general institutional care and supervision, and to perform specified types of surgery depending upon
the privileges granted. Thus, a staff physician is to be distinguished from a resident
physician who is employed by the hospital and whose negligence may, therefore, be
imputed to a hospital under the doctrine of vicarious liability. See Brown v. La Societe
Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 138 Cal. 475, 71 P. 516 (1903) (the first California
Supreme Court case to adopt and apply the theory of vicarious liability for the negligence of a resident physician).
The JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 94 (1984) [hereinafter cited as JCAH ACCREDITATION

provides that "staff physicians" are those physicians who have been afforded
staff privileges by the institution; normally for a period of not more than two years.
Each physician admitting patients to a hospital must be a member of its staff. Id. at 32.
3. For an in-depth examination of the evolution of hospital liability, see
Southwick, Hospital Liability-Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEG. MED. 1
(1983); Relman, The Medical Industrial-Complex, 303 N. ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980).
4. A recent article providing a thorough discussion of the development of hospital
tort liability in California is Comment, The Hospital's Responsibility for its Medical
Staff. Prospectsfor CorporateNegligence in California, 8 PAC. L.J. 141 (1977). See also
Southwick, supra note 1, at 430.
MANUAL]
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Specifically, in response to changing public perception, 5 American courts have begun to question whether a hospital may be responsible for the medical care furnished by its staff physicians. The
hospital is no longer viewed by the public as merely a building
where physicians render medical services. 6 Indeed, it is perceived
as a "unified institution vital to community health, rather than as a
' 7
mere physical shell in which physicians practice their profession."
Consequently, most jurisdictions have expanded the liability of
hospitals by adoption of the "corporate negligence" theory.8 The
doctrine of hospital corporate negligence recognizes that a hospital,
as an institution, has an independent duty to its patients to insure
the competence of its medical staff through careful selection and
review. 9 A hospital that breaches this duty may be held directly
liable to the patient for the resulting harm.10
In 1982, a California court expressly adopted the doctrine of hospital corporate negligence for the first time in the case of Elam v.
5. Today, the public's perception of a hospital is that of "a multi-faceted health
care facility responsible for the quality of medical care and treatment rendered." Elam
v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 344, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 163 (1982).
Indeed, as one commentator has observed, "physician 'house calls' are but a distant
memory." Comment, Anatomy of the ConflictBetween HospitalMedicalStaff PeerReview Confidentiality and Medical MalpracticePlaintiffRecovery: A Casefor Legislative
Amendment, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 661 (1984). See also Southwick, supra note 1,
at 430.
6. The patient admitted to modem health care facilities receives care not only
from his admitting physician, but also from a number of individuals performing such
important services as: emergency medical care, nutritional care, nuclear medicine procedures, nursing care, pathology and medical laboratory services, pharmaceutical services, physical therapy, speech pathology and audiology, and diagnostic and therapeutic
respiratory care services. JCAH ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at v-vi.
7. Note, hdependent Duty of a Hospitalto Prevent a Physician'sMalpractice, 15
ARIZ. L. REv. 953, 967 (1973). See infra note 24 and accompanying text for an analysis
of the modem health care facility.
8. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill.
App. 2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149 (1964), aff'd, 33 Ill.
2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert denied, 383 U.S.
946 (1966), is generally credited with the genesis of hospital corporate negligence. See
infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Darlingdecision and
infra note 22 for a list of those jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine of hospital
corporate negligence.
9. In Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 725, 301
N.W.2d 156, 165 (1981), the Wisconsin Supreme Court concisely summarized the doctrine of hospital corporate negligence, when it observed:
[A] hospital has a direct and independent responsibility to its patients, over
and above that of physicians and surgeons practicing therein, to take reasonable steps to (1) insure that its medical staff is qualified for the privileges
granted and... (2) to evaluate the care provided.
10. As set forth supra note 2, before the emergence of the doctrine of hospital corporate negligence, hospital liability for the negligence of a staff physician was usually
based on the theory of respondeatsuperior. However, inasmuch as staff physicians were
viewed as independent contractors, medical malpractice plaintiffs found it extremely
difficult to recover on a claim against a hospital. For a further discussion of hospital
liability prior to the recognition of the doctrine of hospital corporate negligence, see
infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
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College Park Hospital.11 Noting that a hospital has a duty of reasonable care to protect patients from harm, 12 the California Fourth
Appellate District provided victims with a corporate negligence
cause of action against a hospital for its failure to insure the competence of its medical staff.13 The Elam court emphasized that hospital corporate liability would underscore the strong public policy of
enhancing the quality of medical care by "supplying the hospital

with a14 greater incentive to insure the competence of its medical
staff."

However, California Evidence Code section 1157 [hereinafter re-

ferred to as section 1157], which provides that "[n]either the proceedings nor the records of organized committees of medical...
staffs in hospitals having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of care rendered.., shall be subject to
discovery,"' 5 prohibits discovery of the very evidence necessary to
prove a hospital failed to insure the competence of its medical
11. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, modified, 133 Cal. App. 3d 94a, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982). Prior to Elam, the doctrine,
although not expressly adopted, had been applied at the trial court level. See England v.
Valley Memorial Hosp., Civ. No. 46098-3 (Super. Ct. Alameda County, Cal. Dec. 15,
1977); Memorandum of Decision, Gonzales v. Nork, Civ. No. 228566 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal. Nov. 27, 1973), rev'd, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717
(1976), rev'd and remanded,20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978) (an
oft-quoted opinion wherein now retired Superior Court Judge B. Abbott Goldberg summarized the doctrine of hospital corporate negligence) (copies on file in the offices of
California Western Law Review). See also infra note 51.
12. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 340, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (citing Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945)).
13. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 341, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161. The opinion originally published in the official advance sheets imposed a duty of "careful selection, review and
supervision," but was modified by removal of the term "supervision." 133 Cal. App. 3d
94a.
14. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 345, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
15. Enacted in 1968, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1986), provides in its
entirety:
(a) Neither the proceedings nor the records of organized committees of
medical, medical-dental, podiatric, registered dietitian, psychological, or veterinary staffs in hospitals having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of care rendered in the hospital, or medical or dental
review or dental hygienist review or chiropractic review or podiatric review or
registered dietician review or veterinary review committees of local medical,
dental, dental hygienist, podiatric, dietetic, veterinary, or chiropractic societies, or psychological review committees of state or local psychologicalassociations or societies having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the
quality of care, shall be subject to discovery.
(b) Except as hereinafter provided, no person in attendance at a meeting
of any of those committees shall be required to testify as to what transpired at
that meeting.
(c) The prohibition relating to discovery or testimony does not apply to
the statements made by any person in attendance at * * * a meeting of any of
those committees who is a party to an action or proceeding the subject matter
of which was reviewed at that meeting, or to any person requesting hospital
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staff.-1 6 Prior to Elam, section 1157 was strictly construed on the
grounds that the section manifests a public policy judgment that

confidentiality is essential to insure candor and objectivity within

the committees, thereby promoting the quality of medicine. 17 Following the Elam decision, the public policy of confidentiality underlying section 1157 met head on with the policy of protecting
patients from unreasonable harm through careful selection and review of staff physicians, for the first time, in the case of West Covina
Hospital v. Superior Court.18 Although both the doctrine of hospital

corporate negligence and section 1157 seek to improve the quality
staff privileges, or in any action against an insurance carrier in refusing to
accept a settlement offer within the policy limits.
(d) The prohibitions * * * in this section do not apply to medical, dental,
dental hygienist, podiatric, dietetic, psychological, veterinary, or chiropractic
society committees that exceed 10 percent of the membership of the society,
nor to any of those committees if any person serves upon the committee when
his or her own conduct or practice is being reviewed.
(e) The amendments made to this section by Chapter1081 of the Statutes
of 1983, or at the 1985 portion of the 1985-86 Regular Session of the Legislature, do not exclude the discovery or use of relevant evidence in a criminal
action.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1986). The italicized portions reflect the recent
amendments to section 1157, stemming from Senate Bill 328, passed by the California
Legislature on August 30, 1985, and signed by Governor Deukmejian on September 17,
1985 (Stats. 1985, ch. 725).
16. When used in this Comment, medical staff review committees refer to those
committees responsible for performing: (1) credentials screening, which involves scrutinizing applicants for staff privileges, and (2) peer review, which involves evaluating the
performance of existing staff physicians. Although the ultimate authority to grant,
deny or revoke staff privileges remains with the hospital's governing body, hospitals
delegate the duty to make initial investigations regarding an applicant's qualification for
staff privileges and the duty to evaluate the performance of existing staff physicians to
such medical staff committees. JCAH ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 147.
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals [hereinafter cited as JCAHI] has
been the driving force behind the implementation of these medical staff review, or quality control, committees. The JCAH standards establish that the governing board of the
hospital is responsible for the quality of patient care and, thus, requires that each hospital establish a program of quality assurance. Id. This program is to be carried out by
the medical staff, organized into various committees, acting on behalf of the governing
hospital board. Id. at 89, 95. The committees are to conduct an ongoing system of
review capable of identifying incompetent staff members. Id. at 101. Thus, because the
responsibility for reviewing the staff's competency is delegated to the medical staff,
these committees have been labeled "peer review" committees. Holbrook & Dunn,
MedicalMalpracticeLitigation: The Discoverabilityand Use ofHospital'sQuality Assurance Committee Records, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 54, 56-58 (1976); JCAH ACCREDITATION
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 89-104, 147-49. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 32128 (Deering Supp. 1986).
17. Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974);
Schulz v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 3d 440, 136 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1977); Roseville
Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 3d 809, 139 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1977);
Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hosp. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 626, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 542 (1978); County of Kern v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 3d 396, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 248 (1978).
18. West Covina Hosp. v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 3d 134, 200 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1984).
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of care provided by hospitals, West Covina and its progeny 19 have
held that the policy of confidentiality embodied in section 1157 is
paramount to the policy of protecting a patient from unreasonable
harm.20 Consequently, because discovery of peer review proceedings is indispensable to proving whether a hospital has fulfilled its
duty of careful selection and review, many commentators believe
that the California courts have effectively closed the door on the
victims of hospital corporate negligence, thereby providing hospitals with immunity from liability in some instances.
This Comment discusses the impact of the recent California decisions, which uphold the hospital corporate negligence theory while
denying plaintiffs access to the very evidence they need to prove
such a cause of action-the medical staff committees' files. First, it
will trace the development of the corporate negligence theory, in
California, as well as in other jurisdictions. Second, it will discuss
the impact of section 1157, which provides immunity to hospital
committees responsible for selection and retention of staff physicians, on the Elam theory of hospital corporate negligence. Third,
it will discuss the judiciary's and legislature's common goal, set
forth in the Elam and West Covina decisions, of assuring the quality
of health care, while recognizing the conflict between the cases.
The conflict being that West Covina and section 1157 effectively
deny the plaintiffs redress under the doctrine of hospital corporate
negligence by shielding proceedings and documents of the peer review committees. This Comment will then demonstrate the need
for legislative action by way of either repealing or amending section
1157 to provide for limited discovery, while noting the unlikelihood
that the California Legislature will amend the section. And, finally,
this Comment will propose alternative methods of proving an Elam
cause of action.

I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF HOSPITAL
CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE IN CALIFORNIA

A.

Recognition of the Doctrine in Other Jurisdictions

Historically, hospitals were not legally liable for the medical
treatment rendered by the non-employee physicians who used the
19. Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. App. 3d 711, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 236 (1985); Brown ex reL Brown v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 489, 214

Cal. Rptr. 266 (1985); West Covina v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 3d 794, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 677 (1985), hearing granted,-

Cal. 3d -,

701 P.2d 1171, 215 Cal. Rptr. 853

(July 12, 1985) (en banc); Mt. Diablo Hosp. Medical Center v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.
App. 3d 344, 204 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1984); Saddleback Community Hosp. v. Superior
Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 206, 204 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1984); Snell v. Superior Court, 158

Cal. App. 3d 44, 204 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1984).
20. Id.
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hospital facilities in their individual practices. 2 1 In the past two decades, however, a number of jurisdictions have recognized that a
hospital may be legally responsible for medical treatment provided
to its patients despite the fact that such treatment was rendered by
non-employee staff physicians. 22 These jurisdictions found that, in
addition to a hospital's duty to maintain and operate facilities properly, a hospital owes a duty to patients to insure that only competent physicians practice within the facilities. 23 This is based on the
21. Traditionally, a hospital faced liability only for the negligent acts of its salaried
staff members and certain independent contractors. At first, courts held the hospital
liable for the negligence of its salaried physicians, under the doctrine of vicarious liability, on the theory that only these physicians were subject to the hospital's control. Rice
v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945); La Societe Francaise, 138 Cal. 475, 71 P. 516 (1903). Courts eventually extended the hospital's liability
to include a few staff physicians, under the theory of ostensible or apparent agency, on
the grounds that they were subject to a significant degree of hospital control and were
held out by the hospital as apparent agents. See infra note 25. However, with respect to
most staff physicians, courts treated the hospital as an "empty shell," that merely furnished the staff physicians with the facilities to treat their patients. Courts thus viewed
these physicians as independent contractors, beyond the hospital's control and, therefore, did not hold the hospital liable for their negligence. Moore v. Bd. of Trustees of
Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 211-12, 495 P.2d 605, 608, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879
(1972); Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 316 P.2d 351 (1957); Schloendorf v.
Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (Cardozo, J.) (the seminal case
applying the independent contractor theory). See generally Southwick, supra note 1, at
376, 440; Comment, supra note 3.
22. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984); Buckley v.
Lovallo, 2 Conn. App. 579, 481 A.2d 1286 (1984); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n,
191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983); Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156,
modified, 133 Cal. App. 3d 94a, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982); Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d 708,
301 N.W.2d 156 (1981); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 287 Pa. Super. 364, 430
A.2d 647 (1980); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391 (1980); Johnson v. St.
Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1979); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp.,
65 A.D.2d 388, 411 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1978); Utter v. United Hosp. Centre, Inc., 160 W.
Va. 703, 236 S.E.2d 213 (1977); Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App. 374, 570 P.2d 544
(1977); Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976);
Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1975); Corleto v. Shore
Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975); Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18
Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga.
140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972), aff'g 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971); Foley v.
Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970); Gridley v.
Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431
P.2d 973 (1967); Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232
N.E.2d 776 (1967); Darling,50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964), affrd, 33 Ill. 2d
326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Annot., 51 A.L.R.3D
981. See contra, Schenck v. Government of Guam, 609 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1979); Stogsdill v. Manor Convalescent Home, Inc., 35 Ill. App. 3d 634, 343 N.E.2d 589 (1976) (a
case which limits the doctrine to resident physcians); Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Il. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 671 (1968) (holding that the Darling
theory of corporate negligence applies only to physicians employed by the hospital).
23. Since the Darlingcourt's recognition of a hospital's liability for its direct negligence in failing to review a patient's treatment and require consultation, the doctrine of
hospital corporate negligence has been utilized by the courts to require hospitals to
exercise reasonable care to insure that the physicians selected and retained as members
of hospital medical staffs are competent. Specifically, in Purcell, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 81,
500 P.2d 335, 340 (1972), the court held the defendant hospital liable on the ground
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public's perception of a hospital as a corporate institution which
assumes the role of a health center ultimately responsible for ar24
ranging, coordinating and providing comprehensive health care.
Therefore, rather than relying on ostensible agency 25 or respondeat
that "[t]he Department of Surgery was acting for and on behalf of the hospital in fulfilling [the duty of supervising the competence of staff doctors] and if the department was
negligent in not taking any action against [the physician] or recommending to the board
of trustees that action be taken, then the hospital would also be negligent." Accord,
Tucson Medical Center, 113 Ariz. 34, 36, 545 P.2d 958, 960 (1976) (en banc) (wherein
the Arizona Supreme Court approved the Purcell decision, stating that "[i]f the medical
staff was negligent in the exercise of its duty of supervising its members or in failing to
recommend action by the hospital's governing body prior to the case in issue, then the
hospital would be negligent"); Joiner,229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972) (holding that
a hospital has a duty to investigate, review and pass judgment on a physician's application for staff privileges and cannot rely solely on the fact that he is a state licensed
physician who has been recommended by other members of the medical staff). See also
Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, modified, 133 Cal. App. 3d 94a, 183
Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982); MisericordiaCommunity Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156
(1981); Ferguson, 64 Mich App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1975); Corleto, 138 N.J. Super.
302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975); Board of Trustees of Carson-TahoeHosp., 88 Nev. 207, 495
P.2d 605 (1972). See generally Holbrook & Dunn, supra note 16, at 56.
Additionally, hospitals have been held directly liable for failing to assure that adequate medical histories were taken for patients admitted for treatment (Foley, 185 Neb.
89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970)), and for failing to insist that a licensed physician be present
during surgery (Pederson, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973).
24. In Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 723-24, 301 N.W.2d 156,
164 (1981), the Wisconsin Supreme Court aptly summarized the modem role of health
care facilities as follows:
The public is indeed entitled to expect quality care and treatment while a patient in our highly technical and medically computerized hospital complexes.
The concept that a hospital does not undertake to treat patients, does not
undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but only procures them to act
solely upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. The complex
manner of operation of the modem-day medical institution clearly demonstrates that they furnish far more than mere facilities for treatment. They
appoint physicians and surgeons to their medical staffs, as well as regularly
employing on a salary basis physicians and surgeons, nurses, administrative
and manual workers and they charge patients for medical diagnosis, care,
treatment and therapy, receiving payment for such services through privately
financed medical insurance policies and government financed programs
known as Medicare and Medicaid. Certainly, the person who avails himself of
our modem "hospital facilities".., expects that the hospital staff will do all it
reasonably can to cure him and does not anticipate that its nurses, doctors and
other employees will be acting solely on their own responsibility.
25. Successful recovery against a hospital for alleged acts of an ostensible agent
requires proof that: (1) the person dealing with the agent did so with a reasonable belief
in the agent's authority; (2) the belief was generated by some act or neglect of the hospital sought to be charged; and (3) the third person, in relying on the agent's apparent
authority, was not guilty of negligence. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 825, 291 P.2d
915, 927 (1955) (en banc) (quoting Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54
Cal. App. 2d 141, 146, 128 P.2d 705, 708 (1942)). See also Hill v. Citizens Nat'l Trust
& Say. Bank, 9 Cal. 2d 172, 176, 69 P.2d 853, 855 (1937).
Seneris, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915, is the seminal case in California applying
ostensible agency to a hospital. In Seneris, an action against a hospital and an anesthesiologist for malpractice in the negligent administration of a spinal anesthetic before the
birth of the plaintiff's child, the California Supreme Court held that the jury could find
an ostensible agency relationship. The court reasoned that the fact that the defendant
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superior26 theories of liability, these jurisdictions have held the hospital liable in its own right for breaching a duty owed to its patients.
This breach of an independent duty of care, resulting in direct hospital liability, has been labeled "corporate negligence." 27 To prevail, a plaintiff must show that the defendant hospital's negligent
selection or retention of an incompetent staff physician caused the
28
plaintiff's harm.
The genesis of the doctrine of hospital corporate negligence is attributed to Darling v. Charleston Memorial Hospital,29 a case decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1965. The plaintiff in
Darling was a football player named Dorrence Darling. Darling
broke his leg playing college football and was admitted to Charleston Community Memorial Hospital's emergency room, where he
was attended by a staff physician, Dr. Alexander.30 The doctor applied no padding and put the cast on too tightly, which caused circulatory difficulties. 3 ' The leg became necrotic as a result of the
constriction.32 Obvious symptoms included a foul odor,3 3 discoloration and loss of sensation. Dr. Alexander failed to call for a consultation as required by medical staff bylaws and, further, nurses
with knowledge of the clinical difficulties failed to communicate
their observations to the hospital administration.3 4 Two weeks after
admission, Darling's parents had him transferred to another hospi35
tal where his right leg had to be amputated below the knee.
anesthesiologist was one of six anesthetists on the hospital's staff, that he gave anesthetics for no other hospital; that all drugs and equipment used by him were supplied by the
hospital; that he had regular "on call" duty at the hospital; and that a hospital nurse
summoned him to give the anesthetic in question, was sufficient to establish, prima
facie, that the anesthesiologist was an agent of the hospital. Id. at 832, 291 P.2d at 927.
26. In Beeck v. Tucson General Hosp., 18 Aiz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972),
an Arizona court extended a hospital's respondeat superior liability. Specifically, the
court held the defendant hospital vicariously liable for the negligence of a non-salaried
physician who had an exclusive contract with the hospital to provide an essential service. Id.
27. See supra notes 9 and 23.
28. Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 415, 227 N.E.2d 296, 299, 280 N.Y.S.2d
373, 378 (1967); see also Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitalsand HospitalMedicalStaffs to
Regulate the Quality of Patient Care: A Legal Perspective, 14 PAC. L.J. 55 (1982).
29. Darling,50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964), aff'd, 33 Inl. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
30. 50 I1. App. 2d at 266-68, 200 N.E.2d at 157-58.
31. Id. at 293, 200 N.E.2d at 170.
32. Id. at 290, 200 N.E.2d at 168. "Necrosis" is defined as the "death of living
tissue." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 790 (1983).

33. One witness, describing the odor as "an odor of decaying flesh not smelled
since World War II," testified that he noticed and discussed this odor with the nurses.
Id. at 287, 200 N.E.2d at 167.
34. The nurse's record of observations contained numerous notations of "severe
pain," "no feeling in toes on being touched," "toes feel cold to touch and slight cyanotic," and "foot very edematous and dark." Id. at 270-72, 200 N.E.2d at 159-60.
35. Id. at 290, 200 N.E.2d at 169.
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The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately held Charleston Memorial
Hospital liable on the basis that (1) it was negligent in employing
the nurses who failed to call the patient's deteriorating condition to
the attention of the hospital administration, and (2) it was negligent
in failing "to require consultation with or examination by members
of the hospital surgical staff skilled in such treatment; or to review
the treatment rendered to the plaintiff and to require consultants to
36
be called in as needed."
While the first basis of liability involved the application of respondeat superior,the second basis was particularly significant in that it
used the standards of the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Hospitals [hereinafter referred to as JCAH], 37 the state licensing
regulations and the medical staff bylaws in determining the hospital's duty of care. 38 Violation of these standards and bylaws by the
hospital was found to be evidence of negligence. 39 The court concluded that a hospital owes an independent duty to its patients to
insure that the physicians practicing with its facilities are competent, reasoning that:
"Certainly, the person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities'
expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its
nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility."
: * .The Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the state licensing regulations and the defendant's bylaws demonstrate that the
medical profession and other responsible authorities regard it as
both desirable and feasible that a hospital assume certain responsibilities for the care of a patient.4°
36. 33 Ill. 2d at 338, 211 N.E.2d at 260.
37. The JCAH is a voluntary organization, which was founded in 1951. It is sponsored by the American College of Surgeons, the American College of Physicians, the
American Hospital Ass'n, the American Medical Ass'n, and the Canadian Medical
Ass'n. The JCAH publishes operating criteria for hospitals seeking to acquire or retain
accredited status. If a hospital is found to be in substantial compliance with JCAH
standards, that hospital is awarded accreditation for three years. JCAH ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at xvi.
Today, the JCAH is widely recognized as a standard-setter for hospital practice
throughout the United States. Similar quality assurance standards have been expressly
adopted in many jurisdictions (see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 32128 (West
Supp. 1986); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. arts. 28-34-1, 5 (1986)), and are even mandated by
Congress as a condition for payment under the Medicare program (42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(k), (r), (s)(1983)) and Medicaid program (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19), (26)
(1983)). Indeed, JCAH accreditation is deemed to be prima facie compliance with the
Medicare requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(bb)(a)(1) (1983). Thus, it has been said that
"today, being accredited by the JCAH is nearly as important as being licensed." Loveridge & Kimball, Hospital Corporate Negligence Comes to California: Questions in the
Wake of Elam v. College Park Hospital, 14 PAC. L.J. 803, 807 (1983). See also Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 627 n.2, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319 n.2 (1974); Bredice v. Doctors
Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970).
38. 33 I1. 2d at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 662, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d
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In Darling,4 1 the point that a hospital may be liable for breaching
its duty to review the performance of a staff physician is consistent
with the public perception of present-day hospitals as a "unified institution vital to community health, rather than as a mere shell in
which physicians practice their profession." 4 2 Indeed, the Darling

decision's corporate responsibility theory has received widespread

approval. 4 3 Broadly speaking, it is a recognition of a modern-day
hospital's obligation to protect its patients from harm through the
hospital's supervision of all of the medical care performed within its

facilities. 44

B. Legislative Recognition of a Hospital'sDuty to Review the

Quality of Medical Care Rendered by
Its Staff Physicians
In 1965, the view espoused in Darlingbecame embodied in the

statutory law of California. First, the California Business and Professions Code was amended to require hospitals' governing bodies

to adopt rules providing for the formal organization of medical

staffs.4 5 Specifically, what is now California Business and Professions Code section 2282 was enacted to provide that the regular
3, 11 (1957)). Darling established the concept that a hospital has an independent responsibility to patients to supervise the medical treatment provided by members of its
medical staff. Liability for failure to do so is not founded on respondeat superior, which
has been the traditional mode of recovery. Rather, hospital corporate negligence arises
out of the hospital-patient relationship, not out of the principle-agent relationship between the hospital and physician-employee.
41. Id.
42. See Note, supra note 7, at 967.
43. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. See also Hollowell, Does Hospital
Corporate Liability Law Extend to Medical Staff Supervision?, L. MED.& HEALTH
CARE, Oct. 1982, at 225-27 (discussing the impact of corporate liability).
44. See cases cited and discussed supra notes 22 and 23.
45. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2282 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added)
provides:
The regular practice of medicine in a licensed general or specialized hospital
having five or more physicians and surgeons on the medical staff, which does
not have rules established by the board of directors thereof to govern the operation of the hospital, which rules include, among other provisions, all the following, constitutes unprofessional conduct:
(a) Provision for the organization of physicians and surgeons licensed to
practice in this state who are permitted to practice in the hospital into a formal medical staff with appropriate officers and bylaws and with staff appointments on an annual or biennial basis.
(b) Provision that membership on the medical staff shall be restricted to
physicians and surgeons and other licensed practitioners competent in their
respective fields and worthy in professional ethics. In this respect the division
of profits from professional fees in any manner shall be prohibited and any
such division shall be cause for exclusion from the staff.
(c) Provision that the medical staff shall be self-governing with respect to
the professional work performed in the hospital; that the medical staff shall
meet periodicallyandreview and analyze at regularintervalstheirclinical expe-
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practice of medicine in a hospital which does not have rules established by the governing body, including a provision for a self-governing medical staff which meets periodically to review patient

medical records, constitutes unprofessional conduct. 46 The California Health and Safety Code was also amended to incorporate the
JCAH model of procedures for the appointment and ongoing review of medical staffs into the hospital licensing regulations. 47 In
addition, the California Administrative Code set out detailed standards for quality assurance of medical care through utilization of
the peer review system.48 These standards include a provision that
each hospital's governing body shall require that all physicians periodically "demonstrate their ability to perform surgical and other
rience; that the medical recordsofpatients shall be the basisforsuch review and
analysis.
(d) Provision that adequate and accurate medical records be prepared and
maintained for all patients.
46. Id. (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2282 was formerly CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 2392.5).
47. Amended in 1970 to provide that the staff shall meet in accordance with the
JCAH requirements, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 32128 (West 1973 & Supp.
1986) (emphasis added) provides in part:
The rules of the hospital, established by the board of directors pursuant to
this article, shall include:
1. Provision for the organization of physicians and surgeons, podiatrists, and
dentists licensed to practice in this state who are permitted to practice in the
hospital into a formal medical staff, with appropriate officers and bylaws and
with staff appointments on an annual or biennial basis;
2. Provision for procedure for appointment and reappointment of medical
staff as provided by the standards of the Joint Committee on Accreditation of
Hospitals;
3. * * * Provisions that the medical staff shall be self-governing with respect to the professional work performed in the hospital; that the medicalstaff
shall meet in accordance with the minimum requirements of the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals; and that the medical recordsof the patients
shall be the basisfor such review and analysis;
4. Provision that accurate and complete medical records be prepared and
maintained for all patients (medical records to include identification data, personal and family history, history of present illness, physical examination, special examinations, professional or working diagnoses, treatment, gross and
microscopic pathological findings, progress notes, final diagnosis, condition
on discharge, and such other matters as the medical staff shall determine);
and,
5. Such limitations with respect to the practice of medicine and surgery in
the hospital as the board of directors may find to be in the best interest of the
public health and welfare ....
See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250 (West Supp. 1986) (which states that a
hospital shall have "a governing administrative body with overall administrative and
professional responsibility") and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 32125 (West Supp.
1986) (which confers upon the board of directors the responsibility of its operation in
accordance with "the best interests of the public health," including the power to enact
and enforce rules and regulations necessary for the administration of the hospital).
48. Title 22, § 70701, of the California Administrative Code provides in part:
(a) The governing body shall:
(1) Adopt written bylaws in accordance with legal requirements and its
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procedures competently and to the satisfaction of an appropriate
community responsibility which shall include but not be limited to provision
for:
(A) Identification of the purposes of the hospital and the means of fulfilling them.
(B) Appointment and reappointment of members of the medical staff.
(C) Appointment and reappointment of one or more dentists, podiatrists,
and/or clinical psychologists to the medical staff respectively, when dental,
podiatric, and/or clinical psychological services are provided.
(D) Formal organization of the medical staff with appropriate officers and
bylaws.
(E) Membership on the medical staff which shall be restricted to physicians, dentists, podiatrists, and clinical psychologists competent in their respective fields, worthy in character and in professional ethics....
(F) Self-government by the medical staff with respect to the professional
work performed in the hospital, periodic meetings of the medical staff to review and analyze at regular intervals their clinical experience and requirement
that the medical records of the patients shall be the basis for such review and
analysis.
(G) Preparation and maintenance of adequate and accurate medical
records for all patients.
(7) Require that the medical staff establish controls that are designed to
ensure the achievement and maintenanceof high standardsofprofessionalethical practices including provision that all members of the medical staff be required to demonstrate theirability to perform surgicaland/orother procedures
competently and to the satisfaction of an appropriatecommittee or committees
of the staff,at the time of originalapplicationfor appointmentto the staff and
at least every two years thereafter.
(8) Assure that medical staff by-laws, rules and regulations are subject to
governing body approval, which approval shall not be withheld unreasonably.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 70701 (1983) (emphasis added).
Title 22, § 70703, of the California Administrative Code further elaborates on the
duty of a hospital. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 70703 (1983). That section provides
in pertinent part:
(a) Each hospital shall have an organized medical staff responsible to the
governing body for the adequacy and quality of the medical care rendered to
patients in the hospital.
(1) The medical staff shall be composed of physicians and, where dental or
podiatric services are provided, dentists or podiatrists.
(b) The medical staff by vote of the members and with the approval of the
governing body, shall adopt written by-laws which provide formal procedures
for the evaluation of staff applications and credentials, appointments, reappointments, assignment of clinical privileges, appeals mechanisms and such
other subjects or conditions which the medical staff and governing body deem
appropriate.
(c) The medical staff shall meet regularly. Minutes of each meeting shall
be retained and filed at the hospital.
(d) The medical staff shall provide in its bylaws, rules and regulations for
the functions to be performed by the following committees: executive credentials, medical records, tissue, utilization review, infections and pharmacy and
therapeutics. In those hospitals where appropriate, these functions may be
performed by a committee of the whole or its equivalent. These committees
shall make reports of their activities and recommendations to the executive
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committee or committees of the staff."149 Furthermore, the California Administrative Code requires hospitals to "have an organized
medical staff responsible to the governing body for the fitness, adequacy, and quality of the medical care rendered to patients in the
hospital."5 0 Thus, just as under the JCAH regulatory scheme, California law delegates the quality assurance function within a hospital
to peer review committees.
C. JudicialAdoption of Hospital CorporateNegligence in
California-Elamv. College Park Hospital
In May of 1982, a California court applied the doctrine of hospital corporate negligence for the first time in the case of Elam v.
College ParkHospital.5 1 The court held that the doctrine of hospicommittee and the governing body as frequently as necessary and at least
quarterly.
f) The medical staff shall provide for availability of a staff physician for
emergencies among the in-hospital population in the event that the attending
physician or his alternate is not available.
(i) The medical staff shall develop criteria under which consultation will
be required. These criteria shall not preclude the requirement for consultations on any patient when the director of the service, chairman of a department or the chief of staff determines a patient will benefit from such
consultation.
Id. (emphasis added).
49. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 70701(a)(7) (1983).
50. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 70703(a) (1983).

51. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 337, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 159 (1982). See Memorandum of Decision, Gonzales v. Nork, Civ. No. 228566 (Sup. Ct. of Sacramento County,
Cal. Nov. 27, 1973), rev'd, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd and
remanded,20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978) (copy on file in the
offices of the California Western Law Review), a case indicating that California was
prepared to impose a direct duty of care upon a hospital in its selection and supervision
of a staff physician as early as 1973. Indeed, Superior Court Judge B. Abbott
Goldberg's "opinion in Nork is said to 'articulate almost precisely the same standard as
the Elam opinion."' Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitals and HospitalMedical Staffs to
Regulate the Quality of Patient Care: A Legal Perspective, 14 PAC. L.J. 55, 75 n.119
(1982) (quoting CALIFORNIA MALPRACTICE Topics n.3 (D. Rubsamen ed. June 1982)).

However, the hospital defendant in the Nork case settled out of court so that the court's
proposed memorandum of decision was not binding.
In Nork, a patient sued Mercy Hospital and its staff physician, Dr. John Nork, alleging medical malpractice and fraud. The patient claimed that he had sustained injuries
resulting from back surgery performed by Dr. Nork. The evidence indicated that Dr.
Nork had previously performed more than three dozen incompetent, and, in some cases
even unnecessary, back surgeries; that his medical reports contained fictitious entries;
and that of the more than 60 lawsuits filed in Sacramento County against Dr. Nork,
many of those were also lawsuits against Mercy Hospital. Id. at 15-58. Further,
although Dr. Nork was not a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, he was, nevertheless,
allowed to perform orthopedic surgery. Id.
Judge Goldberg determined that the hospital had no actual knowledge of Nork's misconduct and that the hospital had complied with the JCAH standards for peer review
committees. Id. at 148. Still, he found that the hospital was not immunized from liabil-
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tal corporate negligence was a valid basis to establish hospital liability for a patient's injury caused by the negligence of a staff

physician, on the grounds that the hospital breached its duty "to
insure the competence of its medical staff through careful selection
52
and review."1
Elam asserted that College Park Hospital breached its duty to

insure the competence of its staff physicians.5 3 Elam sought dam-

ages from the hospital because its "Medical Care Evaluation Committee" had reviewed the medical charts of her podiatrist, Dr.
Schur, and had failed to report suspicion of his incompetence to the

hospital administration.

Three malpractice actions had been

brought against him as a result of similar surgeries.5 4 The hospital

admitted that it had learned of one of the malpractice suits against
Schur approximately four and one-half months before Elam's surgery. 55 Based on that knowledge, Elam alleged that the hospital
had breached its independent duty to insure the quality of treatment
ity merely because it had complied with the applicable JCAH standards and functioned
through a medical staff. Id. at 194. Judge Goldberg, in writing the proposed memorandum, made it clear that hospitals in California would be held liable for their own negligence in supervising staff physicians. Indeed, Judge Goldberg's exhaustive opinion
defined the duty of a hospital with respect to its staff physicians as follows:
Mercy Hospital had no actual knowledge of Dr. Nork's propensity to commit
malpractice, but it was negligent in not knowing. It was negligent in not
knowing because it did not.., use the knowledge available to it properly; it
failed to investigate... [the basis for a prior malpractice suit] ... which would
have given it knowledge; and it cannot excuse itself on the ground that its
medical staff did not inform it.
Id.
Judge Goldberg concluded by succinctly stating what has come to be known as the
doctrine of hospital corporate negligence:
I have reached the conclusion that the hospital is liable with great reluctance, because Iam sure that the Sisters of Mercy have done everything within
their power to run a proper institution. But they like every hospital governing
board, are corporately responsible for the conduct of their medical staff.
Id.
52. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 340-41, 183 Cal. Rptr. 161.
53. Id. at 337, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158-59. The complaint alleged:
"During said period of time the defendants COLLEGE PARK HOSPITAL
and DOES ...so negligently and carelessly cared for, treated and rendered
medical services upon the person and body of the plaintiff and so negligently
and carelessly operated, managed, controlled and conducted their services, activities and supervision in connection with plaintiff's care and treatment, and
so negligently and carelessly failed to properly ensure the character, quality,
ability and competence of individuals treatingpatients in said hospitalthat as a
direct and proximate result thereof plaintiff was caused to and did suffer the
injuries hereinafter alleged."
Id. at 335 n.1, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158 n.l (emphasis added).
54. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 336-37, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158. The three cases were: Earlywine v. Schur, No. 359278 (Super. Ct. of San Diego County, Cal. filed October 22,
1974), Perez v. Schur, No. 354963 (Super. Ct. of San Diego County, Cal. filed June 17,
1974), and Bailey v. Schur, No. 383533 (Super. Ct. of San Diego County, Cal. filed June
17, 1976)).
55. Id. at 337, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
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afforded her by failing to conduct a continuing review of Schur.5 6
The trial court disagreed and granted defendant hospital's motion
57
for summary judgment.
The question presented on appeal was "whether a hospital [can
be held] liable to a patient under the doctrine of corporate negligence for negligent conduct of independent physicians and surgeons
who, as members of the hospital staff, avail themselves of the hospital facilities, but who are neither employees nor agents of the hospital."'58 The court noted that it found "no appellate decision of this
state addressing precisely this application of the doctrine of corporate hospital liability.., nor 'considering tort liability of a hospital
for negligent selection or retention of staff practitioners.' 59 Thus,
the court was presented with an opportunity to follow the lead of
the Illinois Supreme Court in Darling,60 and that of several other
jurisdictions, 6 1 in imposing upon a hospital a direct and independent responsibility to its patients of insuring the competency of its
medical staff and the quality of medical care provided through the
"prudent selection, review and continuing evaluation of the physi'62
cians granted staff privileges."
The threshold question of whether a duty was owed to Elam was
commenced with a discussion of the fundamental policy embodied
in section 1714 of the California Civil Code [hereinafter referred to
as section 1714].63 Noting that a duty is presumed under section
1714, the court stated that departure from this fundamental principle involves balancing of the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff did in fact suffer injury, the
moral blame attributable to the defendant's conduct, the burden to
the defendant, the policy of preventing future harm, the consequences to the community of imposing a duty, and the availability
and cost of insurance. 64 Concluding that the imposition of liability
56. Id. at 337, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158-59.
57. Id. at 335, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
58. Id. at 335, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
59. Id. at 337-38, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 159 (citing Matchett, 40 Cal App. 3d 623, 629
n.4, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 321 n.4 (1974), and Comment, Prospectsfor Corporate Negligence in California,supra note 4, at 142). See also supra notes 11 and 51.

60. 33 Ill.
2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), aff'g 50 Ill.
App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d
149 (1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
61. See supra notes 8, 9 and 22.
62. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 346, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
63. Id. at 339, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160. Section 1714 of the California Civil Code
provides in part: "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but
also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
managment of his property or person .
" CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West Supp.
1986).
64. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 339-40, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (citingRowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968) (en banc)).
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is determined largely by the foreseeability of risk, 65 the Elam court
found that harm was indeed foreseeable in the physician-patient relationship and that, therefore, a hospital has a duty to exercise reasonable care in protecting its patients from an "unreasonable risk of
66
harm.",
The court noted that its conclusion was consistent with the public's perception of the modem hospital as a comprehensive health
care facility. 67 Moreover, the court stated that the imposition of a
corporate duty upon the hospital would have the effect of supplementing the California Legislature's efforts. 68 Indeed, the court
said that it would provide the hospital with a greater incentive to
insure the competence of the medical staff within its facilities. 69
The court then summarized its reasons for adopting the corporate negligence theory:
[T]he articulated public policy considerations support the imposition of this general duty .... Moreover, imposing hospitalcorporate liability does not interfere with the Legislature's comprehensive efforts to ameliorate the integrity and quality of the
health care system.., but rather supplements the efforts by encouraging hospitals to actively oversee the competence of their
medical staff and the quality of the medical treatment rendered
on their premises,
while providing victims with an additional av70
enue for relief.
The Elam court's decision is particularly significant in that it
highlights the importance of modem hospital systems designed to
monitor and evaluate the quality of all medical care furnished hospital patients, thus imposing a direct duty upon California hospitals
to insure the competence of its medical staff by careful selection and
continuing review of those physicians granted staff privileges.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE ELAM DECISION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE PLAINTIFFS' ACCESS TO PEER REVIEW
COMMITTEE RECORDS

While the ultimate authority to grant, deny, or suspend staff privileges remains with the hospital administration, the duty to make
65. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 340, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61 (citing Weirum v. RKO
General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1975) and
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968) (en
banc)).

66. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 340-41, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
67. Id. at 344, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
68. Id. at 347, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165. Specifically, the court noted that "the underlying statutory intent of [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1250, 32125, 32128, CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2282 and CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 70701 & 70703] is the
protection and furtherance of the health care interest of the patient." Id.
69. Id. at 345, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
70. Id. at 346-47, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (emphasis added).
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initial investigations, reviews, and recommendations concerning a
physician's staff privileges is delegated to medical staff committees. 7 1 Thus, a hospital must defend itself against a charge of corporate negligence by showing that the committees did, in fact,
carefully investigate and review a physician's qualifications and performance. The plaintiff will want to show that they did not. However, the degree of access a plaintiff has to committee records is

clear.
Section 1157 prevents the discovery of the proceedings and
records of medical staff committees that are performing these quality assurance functions. 72 Additionally, those persons in attendance

at medical staff committee meetings cannot be compelled to testify
or disclose what transpired during the review proceedings. 73 This

section is believed to evince a legislative judgment that confidential
treatment of committee records will promote the quality of in-hos-

pital medical practice. 74 As a result, the door opened by Elam to
provide redress to victims of hospital corporate negligence has, effectively, been closed.
A.

Access to Peer Review Committee Records Priorto the
Elam Decision

Prior to Elam,75 section 1157 and the relatively few cases that
had construed it76 clearly prevented the discovery of medical staff
proceedings in plaintiffs' malpractice actions. The espoused public
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of these peer review committees was set aside only to permit discovery in suits by doctors

claiming wrongful or arbitrary exclusion from hospital staff
77
privileges.
Apparently section 1157 was enacted in 1968, in response to the

71. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, §§ 70701, 70703 (1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE §§ 32125, 32128 (West Supp. 1986).
72. For entire text of section 1157, see supra note 15.
73. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1986). The question of whether a physician in attendance at these meetings can voluntarily testify as to what transpired thereat
was answered in the negative by the California Second Appellate District. West Covina
Hosp. v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 3d 794, 211 Cal. Rptr. 677, hearinggranted,Cal. 3d -, 701 P.2d 1171, 215 Cal. Rptr. 853 (July 12, 1985). See infra notes 179-84
and accompanying text.
74. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1974).
75. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
76. In addition to Matchett, Schulz, Roseville, and Henry Mayo (discussed infra
notes 83-127), see County of Kern v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 3d 396, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 248 (1978) and American Mutual Liability Insur. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 579, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1974), which briefly cite section 1157 as preventing
discovery of peer review committee records and proceedings.
77. Henry Mayo, 81 Cal. App. 3d 626, 635, 146 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547 (1978); Roseville, 70 Cal. App. 3d 809, 814, 139 Cal. Rptr. 170, 172 (1977).
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decision of Kenney v. Superior Court.78 In Kenny, a medical malpractice case, the court ordered production of hospital records dealing with information regarding the competence of the defendant

doctor. 79 By allowing the malpractice plaintiff access to the medi-

cal files revealing peer review committee investigations and appraisals, the court determined that the right of the plaintiff to have
access outweighed the committee's need for confidentiality.80 The

California Legislature disagreed and enacted section 1157, supposedly finding that external access to investigations by peers comprising hospital staff committees would inhibit effective participation. s l
The section, therefore, is advocated as manifesting a public policy
judgment that confidentiality is essential to insure the candor and
objectivity of these committees, thereby promoting the quality of in82
hospital medical practice.

The leading case in California interpreting section 1157 is Match-

ett v. Superior Court.8 3 This case squarely addressed the question of
the discovery of medical staff committee records and proceedings.

Matchett was a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action against
Rideout Memorial Hospital and Dr. Malcom Petaway, a doctor on
its staff. The plaintiff alleged that he suffered injuries, while in the
hospital, resulting from Dr. Petaway's negligent treatment and from
Rideout Hospital's negligence in granting Dr. Petaway staff privileges and retaining him on its staff without adequate inquiry or control over his competence.8 4 In reality, the plaintiff's complaint
stated a cause of action similar to the corporate negligence cause of
action adopted nearly a decade later in Elam.
During the discovery phase of the lawsuit, Matchett sought pretrial discovery of hospital personnel and peer review committee
78. 255 Cal. App. 2d 106, 63 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1967); see also Matchett, 40 Cal. App.
3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
79. 255 Cal. App. 2d 106, 63 Cal. Rptr. 84.
80. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
81. Id. See also Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970)
("Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of apprehension
that one doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a
malpractice suit."); Auld v. Holly, 418 So. 2d 1020, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
quashed in part on other grounds, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984) ("[TI]he medical community [will] not enthusiastically engage in self-policing as a means to improve health care
if the self-policing efforts could later be used in medical malpractice eases."); Gates v.
Brewer, 2 Ohio App. 3d 347, 349, 442 N.E.2d 72, 75 (1981) ("If [the] proceedings [of
disciplinary and review committees become] the subject of discovery, the candid and
conscientious opinions or evaluations necessary to the success of such a review [will]
remain hidden for fear of their use in a civil action brought against a hospital or
colleague.").
82. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320. Accord, Straube v. Larson, 287
Or. 357, 362, 600 P.2d 371, 375 (1979) (wherein the plaintiff argued that "[t]he discussions at such committee meetings, to be of any value, must be frank, even brutal").
83. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974).
84. Id. at 626, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
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records pertaining to Dr. Petaway's selection and retention, including records of the credentials committee, executive committee, tissue committee, and records committee.8 5 The trial court, pursuant
to section 1157, denied Matchett's discovery request.8 6 On appeal,
Matchett argued that the portion of section 1157 which provides
that the prohibition relating to discovery or testimony shall not apply "to any person requesting hospital staff privileges,"8S7 was an
exception which applied, since his lawsuit charged the hospital with
negligent selection or retention of a "person requesting staff
privileges." 88
The appellate court disagreed with Matchett's position. It found
that Matchett's interpretation was inconsistent with the objective of
section 1157.89 The court chronicled the history and application of
section 1157,90 determining the objective of section 1157 to be as
follows:
In an accredited hospital, the organized medical staff is responsible to the hospital governing body for the quality of in-hospital
medical care; it evaluates the qualifications of applicants and
holders of staff privileges; it recommends appointment, reappointment, curtailment and exclusion from staff privileges; it
provides peer group methods for reviewing basic medical, surgical and obstetrical functions.... When medical staff committees
bear delegated responsibility for the competence of staff practitioners, the quality of in-hospital medical care depends heavily
upon the committee members' frankness in evaluating their associates' medical skills and their objectivity in regulating staff privileges. Section 1157 was enacted upon the theory that external
access to peer investigations conducted by staff committees stifles
candor and inhibits objectivity. It evinces a legislative judgment
by
that the quality of in-hospital medical practice will be elevated
armoring staff inquiries with a measure of confidentiality. 9 1
After recognizing that the immunity provided by section 1157
exacts a social cost because it "might seriously jeopardize or even
prevent the plaintiff's recovery," 92 the court held that the exception
"for any person requesting hospital staff privileges" only permitted
discovery in suits initiated by a physician claiming wrongful or arbitrary exclusion from hospital staff privileges. 93 The court then concluded by noting that "[s]ection 1157 represents a legislative choice
85. Id.

86. Id.
87. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157(c) (West Supp. 1986).

88.
section
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

40 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320. See supra note 15 for text of
1157.
Id.
Id. at 628-30, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
Id. at 628-29, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (emphasis added).
Id. at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
Id. at 629-30, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
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between competing public concerns. It embraces the goal of medical staff candor at the cost of impairing plaintiffs' access to
'94
evidence."
Still, the specific finding of the Matchett court was that the trial
court's order denying all of the plaintiff's requested discovery was
"too sweeping."' 95 Specifically, the court explained that "the medical staff immunity described in section 1157 extends to, first, the
proceedings, and second, the records of the described staff committees. It does not embrace the files of the hospitaladministration
"96

Like Matchett, the plaintiff in Schulz v. Superior Court97 sought
to achieve a judicial construction of an exclusionary clause in section 1157. That clause provides for the discovery of "statements
made by any person in attendance at [such] a meeting.., who is a
party to an action or proceeding the subject matter of which was
reviewed at that meeting .. .
In Schulz, the patient-plaintiff's medical malpractice action arose
out of surgery performed in Woodland Memorial Hospital by Dr.
Paul H. Stavig.99 Kathleen Schulz sought pretrial discovery of documents concerning: (1) any statements made regarding a decision
by the medical advisory board to revoke Stavig's surgical privileges;
(2) a letter from Stavig to the medical advisory board; and (3) statements made by any person who was a party to the subject action
who attended any meeting wherein members discussed curtailment
of Stavig's surgical privileges. 10 Following a refusal to produce the
requested documents on authority of section 1157, Schulz filed a
motion to compel. She asserted that the statutory exception to section 1157 for "any person in attendance ... who is a party to an
action or proceeding the subject matter of which was reviewed" at
the meeting vitiates the privilege, since both Woodland Memorial
Hospital and Dr. Stavig were defendants in her malpractice
action. 101
The appellate court disagreed with Schulz, stating that the mere
filing of an action against the doctor reviewed does not "open to
discovery [those] hospital staff records containing medical committee investigation reports and peer appraisals."10 2 The court empha94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
section
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
Id. at 628, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
Id. at 628, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20 (emphasis added).
Schulz, 66 Cal. App. 3d 440, 136 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1977).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157(c) (West Supp. 1986). See supra note 15 for text of
1157.
66 Cal. App. 3d at 442, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
Id. at 442-43, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
Id. at 445, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
Id. at 446, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
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sized that if it were to conclude "that the immunity is to be set aside
when either the staff doctor or the hospital are parties to the malpractice proceeding would not only achieve an absurd result, but
10 3
would render sterile the immunity provisions of the statute."
The court pointed out that the exception applies only to permit discovery in suits by doctors claiming wrongful or arbitrary exclusion
from hospital staff privileges. 104 Nevertheless, the court stressed
that section 1157 applies only to the records and proceedings before
medical investigative committees. "It is," the court observed, "conceivable that the records of the hospital administrative staff do not
contain reference to proceedings of the medical advisory board and,
to that extent, are not within the protection of section 1157."105
The appellate court thus directed the trial court to reconsider those
portions of the pretrial discovery
motion which were directed at
10 6
hospital administration fies.
Section 1157's exception, relating to "any person requesting hospital staff privileges," 10° 7 was again the focus of a California court in
Roseville Community Hospital v. Superior Court.108 Roseville was
the first case in which a court applied the exception to section
1157's immunity and, thus, granted a plaintiff access to medical
staff committee records. 109
In Roseville, Physician's Consulting Laboratories, a partnership
of pathologists, brought an action against Roseville Community
Hospital for breach of a contract naming the partnership as the exclusive clinical pathologist for the hospital.10 Roseville terminated
the contract based upon the recommendations of the medical
staff.11 The trial court ordered the hospital to produce certain
records of the executive committee of the medical staff and of the
professional standards committee.1 12 In response, the hospital
sought, by writ of prohibition, to have the order set aside.113 The
hospital argued that the order violated section 1157.114
103. Id. at 445, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 70.

104. Id. at 446, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
105. Id. at 446, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
106. Id. Thus, like Matchett, the Schulz court noted that § 1157 does not provide
immunity to a hospital's administration files. Accord Saddleback Community Hosp. v.
Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 206, 204 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1984) (where the court relied
on Schulz in ordering an in camera inspection of personnel files to determine whether
files contained any matter immune from discovery under § 1157 as product of staff
evaluation).
107. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157(c)

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

(West Supp. 1986).
Roseville, 70 Cal. App. 3d 809, 139 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1977).
Id. at 816, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
Id. at 812, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
Id. at 815, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
Id. at 812, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
Id.
Id.
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The appellate court disagreed with the hospital, noting that in
Matchett,115 and Schulz, 116 the court anticipated that situations
would arise in which doctors had allegedly been wrongfully terminated or excluded from staff privileges and would, therefore, seek
access to committee fles. 117 It was to just such situations that the
court in Roseville held section 1157's exception relating to "any person requesting hospital staff privileges" was intended to apply.11 8
In Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospitalv. Superior Court,1 19
the Second Appellate District was confronted with another interpretation of section 1157. In Henry Mayo, a medical malpractice
plaintiff alleged that the hospital had waived the immunity provided in section 1157 by lodging a transcript of its staff committee
hearing in a separate administrative mandamus action, wherein the
allegedly incompetent physician, Dr. Beauchamp, was seeking to
overturn a 120-day suspension.1 20 The appellate court followed the
strict interpretation given section 1157 in the Matchett' 2 ' and
Schulz 122 decisions in concluding that:
[T]he benefits of section 1157 were not waived because to hold
otherwise would (1) render hollow immunity provided in section
1157 and subvert the underlying public policy of section 1157 as
articulated in Matchett v. Superior Court,. ..and (2) undermine
the legislative scheme and mechanism which affords a doctor,
who has had sanctions imposed, the opportunity to seek an effective judicial review by way of a mandamus proceeding. 123
The court in Henry Mayo stressed, nevertheless, that section 1157
"applies only to records of... proceedings before medical investigative committees."124 Indeed, the court pointed that out because one
of the interrogatories, requesting the identification of the hospital's
records regarding the granting or curtailing of Dr. Beauchamp's
staff and surgical privileges, appeared to be outside the immunity
provided by section 1157.125
In sum, prior to Elam,12 6 section 1157 and the relatively few
cases that had construed it clearly prevented the discovery of medical staff committee proceedings, thereby upholding the espoused
115. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974).
116. Schulz, 66 Cal. App. 3d 440, 136 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1977).
117. Roseville, 70 Cal. App. 3d at 814, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
118. Id. (stating that Matchett "prophesized the exact issue we now face," and is,
therefore, "no longer dictum").
119. Henry Mayo, 81 Cal. App. 3d 626, 146 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1978).
120. Id. at 628-29, 146 Cal. Rptr. 543-44.
121. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974).
122. Schulz, 66 Cal. App. 3d 440, 136 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1977).
123. Henry Mayo, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 635, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
124. Id. at 636, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 548 (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
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public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of peer review
committees. It is beyond question that peer review committees play
a critical role in furthering the health care interest of the patient
and, that at the time of its enactment, the immunity provided by
section 1157 was consistent with California law concerning hospital
liability. 127 Thus, this author does not dispute the importance of
providing such committees with some measure of confidentiality.
However, now, the Elar theory of hospital corporate negligence
will also serve to enhance the quality of medicine. By forcing hospitals to assume responsibility for their failure to adequately screen
and review staff physicians, Elam has provided hospitals with a financial incentive to insure the competency of their medical staffs.
The question thus arose in the legal and medical communities as to
whether the Elam decision had eroded the protection afforded by
section 1157.
B. Access to PeerReview ProceedingsAfter the Elam Decision:
West Covina and Its Progeny
Under the corporate negligence theory adopted by the Elam
court, a medical malpractice plaintiff can maintain a claim against a
hospital when harmed as a result of (1) a medical staff committee's
failure to properly review the competency of a staff physician or (2)
a hospital's failure to monitor the activities of the peer review committees. As set forth above, while the responsibility for insuring
the competency of the medical staff ultimately remains with the
hospital, traditionally, the duty to select, recommend and review
128
staff physicians has been delegated to medical staff committees.
Thus, it is meaningless to recognize corporate negligence as a cause
of action providing recovery against hospitals when the evidence
necessary to prove it-the medical staff committee file-is not
available to the plaintiffs. As such, subsequent to Elam, plaintiffs
bringing an action against a hospital for corporate negligence argued that the Elam decision had eroded the protection afforded
hospital committees by section 1157.129
The Second Appellate District was the first court to confront this
precise issue in the case of West Covina Hospital v. Superior
Court.130 In West Covina, the plaintiff based her action on the
127. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 628-29, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.

128. See supra note 71.
129. Mt. Diablo Hosp. Medical Center v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 344, 204
Cal. Rptr. 626 (1984); Saddleback Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App.
3d 206, 204 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1984); Snell v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 44, 204
Cal. Rptr. 200 (1984); West Covina Hosp. v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 3d 134, 200
Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984).
130. West Covina, 153 Cal. App. 3d 134, 200 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984).
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Elam theory of hospital corporate negligence.1 31 Specifically, patient Terri Jo Tyus brought an action against West Covina Hospital
for the negligent selection and retention of its staff physician, Dr.
McCowan.1 32 The trial court granted plaintiff's discovery requests
for records indicating at which hospital committee meetings Dr.
McCowan's work had been discussed and whether Dr. McCowan
served upon any hospital committees. 133 In so doing, the trial court
compelled the hospital to produce the attendance records of the
medical staff and compelled the deposition of a hospital employee
1 34
with medical staff committee minutes and attendance sheets.
The trial court held that this information was necessary for the
plaintiff to establish the requisite foundation for seeking discovery
of the contents of the meetings under the exception now contained
in subsection (d) of section 1157. That paragraph states that section
1157's prohibitions do not apply "if any person serves upon the
committee when his or her own conduct or practice is being reviewed." 1 35 Defendant hospital petitioned for a writ of mandate to
compel the trial court to vacate and set aside the discovery

orders. 136
Thus, the question presented on appeal was whether the exception contained in the fourth paragraph of section 1157 allowed discovery of hospital committee proceedings if the doctor involved in
the malpractice action was a member of the committee whose
records were being sought at the time his conduct was being re-

viewed by

it.137

The Second Appellate District held that the trial

court had misread the statute.13 8 The court explained that the statute refers to two separate types of committees: (1) those of a hospital staff and (2) those of a medical society.1 39 The court interpreted
the statutory exception plaintiff relied upon as applying only to
131. Id. at 138-39, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
132. Id. at 136, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
133. Id. at 137, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
134. Id. at 139, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
135. Id. at 137, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 164. Section 1157 was amended in Sept. 1985 by
dividing the statute into five subsections. See supra note 15. Prior thereto, the statute
contained no divisions and was, therefore, subject to different interpretations. At the
time of the West Covina decision, the subject exception, although nearly identical to its
1985 amendment, read:
The prohibitions contained in this section shall not apply to medical, dental,
dental hygienist, podiatric, dietetic, veterinary or chiropractic society committees that exceed 10 percent of the membership of the society, nor to any such
committee if any person serves upon the committee when his or her own conduct or practice is being reviewed.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1984).
136. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
137. Id. at 137, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65.
138. Id. at 138, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
139. Id.
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medical society committees, not to hospital staff committees.1 4°
Plaintiff also contended that the attendance records of peer review committees were relevant to a malpractice action based on
hospital corporate negligence. 141 The appellate court agreed with
the plaintiff's statement concerning the relevancy of the evidence,
but stated that relevancy could not serve to validate the error of
misapplication by the trial court of the exclusions described in the
fourth paragraph of section 1157 to a situation to which only the
first three paragraphs apply. 142 The court directed the trial court to
vacate and set aside its discovery order,1 43 thus following the narrow judicial interpretation given section 1157 by the Matchett
court. 144 The court reasoned as follows:

[T]he Legislature has made the judgment call that an even more
important societal interest is served by declaring such evidence
"off limits." No appellate case construing Evidence Code section
1157 since Elam has been brought to our attention. Nothing in
the prior cases interpreting the statutes suggest a different result
in the case at bar.
...

[N]othing in Elam holds or even suggests a result contrary

to that reached
in [Henry Mayo; Roseville; Schulz; or
145

Matchett].

Shortly thereafter, the Third Appellate District confronted the
conflict between section 1157 and the Elam theory of hospital corporate negligence in the case of Snell v. Superior Court.146 In Snell,
the plaintiff-patient Linda Snell brought a motion to compel production of Marshall Hospital's personnel files, including Dr. William Colliflower's and Dr. Robert Carter's applications for surgical
privileges.147 Snell asserted that the hospital personnel files, maintained by the hospital administration, were not immune from discovery under section 1157 on the ground that section 1157 only
148
provides immunity to medical investigative committees' records.
Marshall Hospital's opposition was based on the declaration of the
hospital administrator, Frank Nachtman, in which he stated that
140. Id.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 139, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 165.

143. Id. at 139 n.4, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 166 n.4. In its order to the trial court, the
appellate court noted that it was simply voiding the lower court's ruling since it would

result in the discovery of statutorily defined non-discoverable matter. The court
pointed out that it was not directing the lower court to either reword and limit its order,
or provide for in camera inspection to determine which matters were discoverable and
which were protected by section 1157. The court was simply declaring the trial court's
discovery order void. Id.
144. Id. at 139, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
145. Id. at 138-39, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
146. Snell v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 44, 204 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1984).
147. Id. at 46, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
148. Id.
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the personnel files of the doctors were not files of the hospital administration, but were files of the quality assurance committee.14 9
150
The trial court denied Snell's motion to compel.

Snell's argument on appeal was twofold. First, she argued that
the Elam decision constituted a substantial change in the scope of
the application of section 1157.151 The court disagreed,1 52 holding

that Matchett, was essentially a hospital corporate negligence action
and, thus, controlled.1 53 Therefore, the court stated:
We fail to discern anything in Elam which holds or even suggests
a result contrary to that reached in prior cases interpreting or
construing Evidence Code section 1157 ....The relevance of a
hospital's records to show its conduct, whether careful or negligent, cannot serve as an implied exception to the clear, absolute
immunity legislatively established in Evidence Code section
1157.154

Second, Snell argued that while Matchett held peer review com-

mittee records immune from discovery under section 1157, Matchett had also stated that section 1157 did not embrace the files of the
hospital administration as distinguished from the peer review committee.1 55 In particular, the Matchett court noted that "'[t]he trial
court should have inquired into the existence of a hospital administration file concerning the doctor and, if such a file existed, should
have permitted its inspection, excluding any portions which reflected the proceedings of staff committees conforming to the specifications of the immunity statute.' "156 Therefore, Snell argued that
the hospital personnel file was discoverable.
Nevertheless, the Third Appellate District denied Snell's petition
for peremptory writ of mandate.1 57 The court agreed that the im-

munity provided by section 1157 did not embrace the files of the
hospital administration.1 58 However, the court pointed out that the

hospital administrator's declaration stated that the hospital admin149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 48, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 49 n.1, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 202 n.1. Schulz, supra,66 Cal. App. 3d at 445,
136 Cal. Rptr. at 70, was also essentially an action involving the negligent selection and
retention of a staff physician. The Schulz court stated as follows: "To declare that the
immunity is to be set aside when either the staff doctor or the hospital are parties to the
malpractice proceeding would not only achieve an absurd result, but would render sterile the immunity provisions of the statute." Id.
154. 158 Cal. App. 3d at 48-49, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 202-03.
155. Id. at 49, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
156. Id. (quoting Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320). Accord
Saddleback Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 206, 204 Cal. Rptr.
598 (1984).
157. 158 Cal. App. 3d at 51, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
158. Id. at 49, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
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istration did not maintain personnel files on the two doctors.15 9
The declaration stated that the personnel files only contained files
of the quality assurance committee, which were immune from discovery. 160 Plaintiffs did not produce any evidence to the contrary.
Thus, the only evidence presented was that the hospital did not
maintain administration files concerning the doctors and did not
have in its possession applications for surgical privileges. 16 1 Thus,
the appellate court noted that while the trial court had a duty to
inquire into the existence of personnel files, because the petitioner
failed to provide a transcript of the hearing on the motion to compel, the record was inadequate to determine whether there was an
abuse of discretion in that regard. 162 The appellate court was,
therefore, compelled to deny Snell's petition by reason of lack of
163
evidence.
Fifteen days after the Snell decision, the Fourth Appellate District announced it decision in the next case involving the Elam-section 1157 conflict, Saddleback Community Hospital v. Superior
Court.'64 In Saddleback, Brett Harvey, by his guardian ad litem,
Michael Harvey, filed an action against Saddleback Community
Hospital and two doctors, seeking damages for mishandling Brett's
fractured femur.' 65 During the discovery phase of the lawsuit,
Brett sought specific documents from the personnel files of thirtyseven individuals who had cared for him. 66 The trial court ordered
production.
On appeal, the Fourth Appellate District concluded that the trial
court erred in allowing the blanket inspection of all of the requested
fies, relying on the Matchett court's interpretation of section
159. Id.

160. Id.
161. Id. at 50, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 203.

162. Id. at 49, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
163. Id. at 49-50, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 203. Specifically, the court noted that:
"In the absence of a transcript [a] reviewing court [has] no way of knowing in
many cases what grounds were advanced, what arguments were made and
what facts may have been admitted, mutually assumed or judicially noticed at

the hearing. In such a case, no abuse of discretion can be found except on the
basis of speculation."
Id. at 49, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 203 (quoting Lemelle v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d

148, 156-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. 450, 455 (1978)).
164.
(Kaus,
165.
166.
lowing

Saddleback, 158 Cal. App. 3d 206, 204 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1984), hearing denied,
Broussard and Reynoso, J.J., dissenting).
Id. at 207-08, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
Id. at 208 n.1, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 599 n.l. Specifically, Brett requested the foldocuments from each individual's personnel file:
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1157.167 Nevertheless, in issuing a peremptory writ of mandate, it
directed the trial court to enter an order in accordance with the
dictates of its opinion, specifically holding that:
To protect both parties in this instance, there must be an in camera hearing by the trial court, reviewing each item of evidence
requested and acting "upon those portions of petitioner's pretrial
discovery motion which are directed only at hospital administration files not resulting
from [any] investigation conducted by [an]
16 8
advisory board."
Less than one month later, the First Appellate District con..
fronted the conflict. In Mt. DiabloHospitalMedical Center v. Superior Court,1 69 patient James Pope brought a medical malpractice
action against Mt. Diablo Hospital for alleged malpractice by a doctor given staff privileges by the hospital. 170 During the discovery
stage of the lawsuit, Pope propounded interrogatories asking for information regarding: (1) any action taken on the doctor's application for staff privileges; (2) any action taken to revoke his staff
privileges; (3) any investigation or evaluation of his qualifications
during his tenure on the hospital staff, (4) the existence of a peer
review committee; and (5) the identity of certain peer review committee members.' 7 1 In response, Mt. Diablo Hospital asserted the
privilege provided by section 1157.172 The trial court granted
Pope's motion to compel answers on the grounds that the Elam
(a) Employment applications;
(b) Resumes and letters of recommendation or evaluation;
(c) Inquiries concerning verification of employment application and all responses thereto;
(d) Tests given to the employees and all results thereof;
(e) Evaluations, reviews, critiques and ratings;
(f) Complaints and all responses thereto;
(g) Commendations or awards;
(h) Any evidence of training and/or education;
(i) Any indicia of authority to render services (licenses, etc.);
(i) Writings concerning promotions or the denial thereof;
(k) Writings concerning demotions, reassignments, or transfers;
(1) Writings concerning discipline, suspensions, dismissals and/or reprimands;
(m) Medical and psychiatric histories;
(n) Schedules, work loads, shift assignments, and writings concerning vacation or absenteeism; and
(o) All other writings pertaining to work performance.

Id.
167. Id. at 208, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 599-600.
168. Id. at 209, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (quoting Schulz, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 447, 136
Cal. Rptr. at 71, and citing Henry Mayo, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 636-37, 146 Cal. Rptr. at
548).
169. 158 Cal. App. 3d 344, 204 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1984).
170. Id. at 345-46, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
171. Id. at 346, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
172. Id. at 346, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
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decision diminished the protection provided by section 1157.173
On review, the First Appellate District noted that the argument
made by Pope, and accepted by the trial court, had been made and
rejected in West Covina.174 The court agreed with the West Covina
court's holding that the Elam decision had not diminished the protection provided by section 1157.175 Further, the court did not
agree with the plaintiff's argument that section 1157 abridges the
plaintiff's rights to due process and equal protection.1 7 6 It concluded with the following often quoted passage from Matchett:
"Section 1157 represents a legislative choice between competing
public concerns. It embraces the goal of medical staff candor [in
appraising their peers to improve the quality of in-hospital medical practice] at the cost of impairing plaintiffs' access
to evidence
' ' 17 7
[revealing the incompetency of a hospital's staffJ.
The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial
court to reconsider the motion to compel answers and to determine
whether the hospital, as to each question asked, could not respond
without "divulging the 'proceedings [or] the records' of the medical
178
staff committees to which section 1157 refers."
Nearly one year after the Second Appellate District Court's wellknown decision in West Covina, the medical malpractice case involving plaintiff Terri Jo Tyus was once again the subject of a petition for writ of mandate. Specifically, in West Covina v. Superior
Court [hereinafter referred to as West Covina II],179 Tyus sought to
call as a witness at trial a physician, Dr. Anwar, who served on a
medical staff committee of the hospital when the committee evaluated Dr. McGowan, to testify about specific details of that evaluation.1 80 Over objections by the hospital, the trial court held that
173. Id. at 346, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 347, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 347, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (citing Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115
Cal. Rptr. at 320). See also Saddleback, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 208, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 599600.
178. 158 Cal. App. 3d at 347-48, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
179. West Covina Hosp. v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 3d 794, 211 Cal. Rptr.
677, review granted,- Cal. 3d -, 701 P.2d 1171, 215 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as West Covina 11]. In reality, this is plaintiff Terri Jo Tyus' third attempt to
overcome what has become a common practice of many hospitals; relying on section
1157 as a subterfuge. Her first attempt was rejected by the trial court judge; subsequent
petitions to the Second Appellate District Court and California Supreme Court being
denied. West Covina II, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
180. On review before the California Supreme Court, one of Petitioner on Review
Tyus' arguments was that § 1157 did not apply because "the committee which evaluated Dr. McGowan was not a properly constituted medical staff committee but was
'stacked' on this occasion, i.e., it was not an 'organized' committee of the Hospital's
medical staff within the meaning of § 1157." Petitioner on Review's Reply Brief and
Response to the California Medical Association's Amicus Brief at 15, West Covina 11,
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"'a committee member may waive the exclusion of 1157 ....[B]y
that I mean that a committee member can come into court and tell
us of the entire proceeding in a medical staff committee.' "181
The precise issue confronted on appeal was whether section 1157,
which provides in relevant part that no person in attendance at a
meeting of a medical staff committee shall be "required" to testify
as to what transpired at that meeting, prevents a concerned physi-

cian-member of the committee from testifying voluntarily for the
plaintiff as to what occurred at the meeting. 182 The Second Appel-

late District Court, completely ignoring the plain language of section 1157,183 relied again on the legislative intent espoused by the
Matchett court in reversing the trial court and held that to permit

unrestricted trial testimony would "punch a judicially created and
legislatively unintended hole in the crucial shield of confidentiality

provided to medical staff committees in medical malpractice
actions."

184

supra note 179, No. L.A. 32083, review granted,- Cal. 3d--, 701 P.2d 1171, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 853, reviewing, 165 Cal. App. 3d 794, 211 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as Petitioner on Review's Reply Brief] (copy on file in the offices of the California
Western Law Review). Tyus pointed out that that threshold inquiry concerning
§ 1157's application is "whether the committee whose proceedings are sought to be
protected is a regularly constituted committee within the meaning of the statute, and
that the burden of proof is on the party resisting disclosure." Id. (citing Matchett, 40
Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974); Franco v. District Court, 641 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1982); Monty v.
Warren Hosp. Corp., 422 Mich. 138, 366 N.W.2d 198 (1985); Anderson v. Breda, 103
Wash. 2d 901, 700 P.2d 737 (1985); Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wash. 2d 270, 677 P.2d 173
(1984)).
181. West Covina II, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
182. Id. at 795, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 677. See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157(b) (West
Supp. 1986); Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at 1-2, West Covina II, supra note
179, No. L.A. 32083, review granted,- Cal. 3d -, 701 P.2d 1171, 215 Cal. Rptr. 853,
reviewing, 165 Cal. App. 3d 794, 211 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Opening Brief] (copy on file in the offices of the California Western Law
Review).
183. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157(b) (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added) clearly
states:
(b) Except as hereinafter provided, no person in attendance at a meeting
of any of those committees shall be required to testify as to what transpired at
that meeting.
This language is clear and unambiguous. It states that no person in attendance at the
meaning shall be "required," i.e., compelled, to testify. Id. It does not say that no one
in attendance "shall testify." Id. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court will probably affirm the appellate court's decision inasmuch as in the recent case of People v.
Aston, 39 Cal. 3d 481, 489, 703 P.2d 111, 114, 216 Cal. Rptr. 771, 774 (1985), the
California Supreme Court stated:
This court has emphasized time and time again that the fundamental rule of
statutory interpretation is to "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to
effectuate the purpose of the law." In ascertaining the legislative intent,
courts should consider not only the words used, but "the object in view, the
evils to be remedied, the legislative history [and] public policy ...
Id. (citations omitted).
184. West Covina II, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 678. On July 12,
1985, the California Supreme Court granted review of the West Covina II decision.
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In summary, subsequent to the Fourth Appellate District's holding in Elam v. College ParkHospital, the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Appellate Districts have continued to limit the discoverability of medical staff committee proceedings, relying on the legislative
intent espoused by Matchett. The courts have thereby prevented
plaintiffs from obtaining important evidence which they need to
prove hospital corporate negligence. Consequently, although the
courts opened the door to plaintiffs by adopting hospital corporate
negligence, by strictly construing section 1157, the courts have effectively denied plaintiffs' redress for a hospital's negligent selection
and review of staff physicians. Moreover, in some instances, the
courts may have even provided negligent hospitals with immunity
from liability. Indeed, as stated by now retired Superior Court
Judge B. Abbott Goldberg:
The actual result of the [section 1157] privilege is to protect hospitals and doctors from liability to their patients; the frequently
espoused goal of fostering candor has proven to be a dissimulabarrier to the
tion.... [I]n reality the privilege serves
18 5 as a...
disclosure of ineffective peer review.
III.

THE CONFLICT: ELAM AND WEST COVINA

Clearly, both section 1157 and the Elam hospital corporate negligence theory of liability have the same goal of high quality medical
care in mind. However, as construed by the courts, section 1157
presents a conflict in that it denies victims the very evidence they
need to prove a corporate negligence cause of action.
The conflict between Elam and West Covina results from a difference in approach taken by the judiciary in Elam and the legislature
in section 1157. Section 1157 attempts to improve the quality of
medical practice by providing an immunity to the proceedings of
peer review committees. The Matchett court advocated that the
section evinces a legislative judgment that candor and objectivity
will only flourish where staff investigators know that their opinions
will be kept confidential. On the other hand, although Elam
manifests the same policy of improving the quality of medical practice, Elam does so by holding a hospital accountable for its failure
to either review its staff physicians or monitor the activities of its
peer review committees. Elam demonstrates a focus on improving
the quality of medicine through holding a hospital accountable. It
seeks to secure a proper screening of the competency of hospital
West Covina 17,- Cal. 3d--, 701 P.2d 1171, 215 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1985). The California
Supreme Court has not heretofore construed the scope of § 1157. Santa Rosa, 174 Cal.
App. 3d at 719 & n.6, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 241 & n.6 (1985).
185. Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 10
AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 156, 162 (1984).
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physicians through the imposition of a legal duty on the hospital
corporate entity, rather than through reliance on physicians to voluntarily improve the quality of medicine themselves.
Clearly, both section 1157 and the Elam hospital corporate negligence theory of liability have the same goal of high quality medical
care in mind. As the opinion in West Covina points out, section
1157 " 'evinces a legislative judgment that the quality of in-hospital
medical practice will be elevated by armoring staff inquiries with a
measure of confidentiality.' 186 Similarly, the Elam court stated
that "imposing the duty of care upon a hospital should have the
'prophylactic' effect of supplying the hospital with a greater incentive to assure the competence of its medical staff and the quality
care rendered within its walls."' 8 7 Both the doctrine of hospital
corporate liability and section 1157 seek to improve the quality of
care provided by hospitals; however, the doctrine of hospital corporate liability does so by exposing the hospital's peer review committees to judicial scrutiny for failure to comply with professional
norms, while section 1157 does so by shielding peer review committee proceedings from discovery.
IV.

RECONCILIATION OF THE CONFLICT:

LEGISLATIVE ACTION

Two premises support peer review protection: first, that special
privileges and immunities do, in fact, result in increased peer review

activities; and second, that increased peer review activity results in
the enhancement of the quality of medicine. However, no empirical
evidence has been provided to date proving that the peer review

system is actually working to insure high quality medical care in
hospitals-not even by the California Medical Association.188 Further, the Elam court's adoption of the corporate negligence theory
of liability has undermined the legislature's determination that the
best way to improve the quality of medicine is to provide peer re186. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (quoting Matchett, 40 Cal. App.
3d 623, 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320).
187. 132 Cal. App.3d 332, 345, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 164.
188. Petitioner on Review's Reply Brief, supra note 180, at 12. Indeed, it has been
reported that a senior officer of the JCAH, which conducts accrediting investigations of
over 5000 hospitals nationwide, said, "'At least 85 percent of our recommendations to
hospitals after surveys are relative to medical staff activities, primarily physician monitoring functions."' Brinkley, Shakeup in Medical Malpractice: 'System' Ill-Protects
Public from Unqualified Doctors, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 10, 1985, § 1, at 4, col. 1. The
ineffectiveness of the peer review system is illustrated by the following case. In 1980,
Dr. John R. Bongiovanni lost his eyesight, but is reported to have performed surgery on
eight more patients. Id. The hospital's administrator claimed that the procedures Dr.
Bongiovanni performed "had been the sort for which a surgeon relies on the sense of
touch." Id. The New York Board of Regents fined the hospital $4000 for allowing
him to practice. Id.
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view committees with protection. For the Elam theory of hospital
corporate negligence will be more effective in promoting the quality
of health than section 1157. It will provide hospitals with a greater
incentive for monitoring the peer review process, by holding a hospital liable for its failure to do so, thereby insuring staff committee
effectiveness. Indeed, as has been so aptly stated:
[T]here is no question that the threat of malpractice suits is an
inducement to elevate the diligence of medical performance.
Since most such suits involve the management of serious cases in
the hospitals, the influence is felt strongly on the organization
189 of
medical staffs and other components of hospital operation.
Consequently, Elam must be made viable in order to enhance the
quality of medical care. Section 1157 must be either amended or
repealed. Such legislative action is necessary because while Elam
recognized an independent duty owed by a hospital to its patients to
protect them from harm, without such action, an injured plaintiff's
recovery for a breach of this duty is extremely doubtful. Specifically, a peer review committee which fails to evaluate and review its
staff physicians, or a hospital which ignores a recommendation of a
peer review committee to terminate an incompetent physician, may
escape liability for the resulting harm which a patient incurs. As a
result, negligently run hospitals will be shielded by section 1157.
Indeed, hospitals are relying on section 1157 as a subterfuge.
They are asserting the privilege with respect to information not
within the exclusive province of the activities of a protected medical
staff committee for the improper purpose of obstructing discovery
of work actually undertaken by the hospital administration. This
fact is illustrated in the recent case of Brown ex rel. Brown v. Superior Court, wherein Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Ricardo
Torres expressed his frustration:
"I think it's a little on the outrageous side that all of the hospitals
are no longer holding [the information] in administrative files
and putting everything in those committees and everything is going there, but 1157 says that is privilege.... There is no question
in the court's mind... that the hospitals are abusing 1157, but I
can't do anything about that."' 190
Moreover, the view espoused in Matchett, specifically, that
"[s]ection 1157 was enacted upon the theory that external access to
peer investigations conducted by staff committees stifles candor and
inhibits objectivity," 19 1 is belied by the actual operation of the stat189. Roemer, Controllingand Promoting Quality in Medical Care, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 284, 297 (1970).
190. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 489, 495, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 266, 270 (1985).
191. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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ute. Particularly, whenever a disgruntled physician challenges the
action taken by a peer review committee concerning his staff privileges, section 1157 permits the shield of confidentiality to be
pierced. 192 In such a case, the prohibitions of the statute do not
apply at all:
(c) The prohibition relating to discovery or testimony does
not apply to the statements made by any person in attendance at
a meeting of any of those committees who is a party to an action
or proceeding the subject matter of which was reviewed at that
meeting, or to any person requesting hospital staff privileges
193

Since members of medical staff committees are obviously aware
that the entire proceedings are available to a physician who challenges their decision, it should not "stifle candor or inhibit objectivity" just because an Elam plaintiff may also be entitled to
information concerning the proceedings. Clearly, the legislature
could not have felt that the need to protect committees' confidentiality is greater when the plaintiff is an injured patient, than when
the plaintiff is a staff physician seeking review of, or redress for, a
committee decision. The committee members have no need to fear
a plaintiff; members of hospital staff committees are immune from
liability.1 94 Thus, the real threat to a committee member's objectiv-

ity and candor lies not with an injured patient, but with a disgruntled colleague who has complete access to the records, testimony
and proceedings of hospital staff committees. It is no wonder that
there is no empirical data evidencing the effectiveness of section

1157 when the legislature has given the wrong plaintiff access to the
evidence. The legislature's real fear was that plaintiffs would use
the information to hold a hospital liable.
192. Roseville, 70 Cal. App. 3d 809, 139 Cal. Rptr. 170.
193. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1157(b) (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). See supra
note 15 for the entire text of § 1157.
194. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.7 (West Supp. 1986) provides in relevant part:
(b) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of
action for damages shall arise against,... any member of a duly appointed
committee of a professional staff of a licensed hospital . . . for any act or
proceeding undertaken to be performed within the scope of the functions of
any such committee ... or any member of any peer review committee whose
purpose is to review the quality of medical, dental, dietetic, chiropractic, optometric, or veterinary services... or any member of the governing board of a
hospital in reviewing the quality of medical services rendered by members of
the staff if such professional society, committee, or board member acts without malice, has made a reasonable effort to obtain the facts ... and acts in
reasonable belief ....
See also CAL, CIV. CODE § 43.8 (West Supp. 1986) (providing a conditional immunity
to those who communicate information to a hospital, hospital medical staff or professional society); CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West Supp. 1986) (providing an absolute privilege for "any publication or broadcast" made in any "proceeding authorized by law and
reviewable" by way of administrative mandamus).
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Additionally, the statute itself contains inherent weaknesses. One

such weakness is that section 1157 does not expressly prohibit the
admissibility of medical staff committee records or proceedings. 195
By contrast, section 1156,196 which pertains to the records of medical staff committees engaged in research for the purpose of reducing
morbidity and mortality, expressly declares those records not discoverable and inadmissible. 197 Although the California Medical
Association takes the position that sections 1156 and 1157 should
be read together to make all medical staff committee records
nondiscoverable and inadmissible, 1 98 arguably, if the legislature had
desired to render the proceedings and the records of section 1157
inadmissible, it would not have left such an important fact to inference, but would have used appropriate language. 199 The specific
question, not yet addressed then, is whether a defendant hospital,
after refusing to produce section 1157 records during the discovery
phase of a lawsuit may, nevertheless, admit the evidence at trial in
its defense and to the detriment of the plaintiff.
A second weakness is found in subsection (b). A literal construc-

tion of subsection (b), which provides that "no person in attendance
at a meeting... shall be required to testify as to what transpired at
the meeting, ' '2°° would find that this prohibition against compelled

testimony does not apply (1) to anyone not in attendance at the
195. See text of § 1157, supra note 15.
196. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1156 (West Supp. 1986) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In-hospital medical or medical-dental staff committees of a licensed
hospital may engage in research and medical or dental study for the purpose
of reducing morbidity or mortality, and may make findings and recommendations relating to such purpose. Except as provided in subdivision (b), the written records of interviews, reports, statements, or memoranda of such inhospital medical or medical-dental staff committees relating to such medical
or dental studies are subject to Section 2016 to 2036, inclusive, of the Code of
Civil Procedure (relating to discovery proceedings) but, subject to subdivisions
(c) and (d), shall not be admitted as evidence in any action or before any
administrative body, agency, or person.
197. Id. This inherent weakness in the language of section 1157 was pointed out by
the Matchett court:
[S]ection 1157 establishes an immunity from discovery but not an evidentiary
privilege in the sense that medical staff records are excluded from evidence. It
stands in contrast with Evidence Code section 1156, which expressly subjects
to discovery hospital staff studies made for the purpose of reducing morbidity
or mortality, but excludes them as evidence.
Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629 n.3, 115 Cal Rptr. at 320 n.3.
198. Request for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of West Covina
Hosp. and Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the California Medical Ass'n in Support of
Petitioner [sic] West Covina Hosp. at 15-16, West Covina II, supra note 179, No. L.A.
32083, review granted,- Cal. 3d -, 701 P.2d 1171, 215 Cal. Rptr. 853, reviewing, 165
Cal. App. 3d 794, 211 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1985) [hereinafter cited as CMA Amicus Curiae
Brief] (copy on file in the offices of the California Western Law Review).
199. Petitioner on Review's Reply Brief, supra note 180, at 11-12.
200. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157(b) (West Supp. 1986). See supra note 15 for entire
text of § 1157.
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meeting and (2) to anyone who volunteers testimony. 20 1 Arguably,
voluntary testimony by a physician, at least as to what he said at the
meeting, will not impair other members' candor and objectivity.
Clearly, legislative action is necessary to address the inconsistencies in the statute itself, as well as the apparent hospital abuse. Section 1157 must be amended either to provide complete discovery to
medical malpractice plaintiffs or to provide, at a minimum, for discovery concerning the fact of whether an evaluation of the physician was conducted, the evaluation dates, any document supplied to
the committee by an independent source that is not otherwise privileged, the fact and contents of any recommendation made by the
peer review committee to the hospital administration, and a descrip..
tion of what, if any, action was taken by the hospital. In this man..
ner, plaintiffs may determine whether hospitals are fulfilling their
duty of reviewing and monitoring staff physicians. As a result, the
public interest in peer review participation and candor will be preserved, as will the public interest in protecting patients from unreasonable harm.
V.

THE ROUTE AROUND SECTION

1157's BARRIERS

Faced with the recent legislative amendment to section 1157, extending its protections to hospital psychological staff committees
and to review committees of psychological associations and societies, 20 2 it is unlikely that the California Legislature will amend or
repeal section 1157 in the near future. For, it is a well-established
principle of statutory construction that when the legislature amends
a statute without altering portions that have been previously judicially construed, "the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of
and to have acquiesced in the previous judicial construction. Accordingly, reenacted portions of the statute are given the same construction they received before the amendment." 20 3 Thus, medical
malpractice plaintiffs should focus their energy on pursuing ways
around the 1157 restrictions.
201. The California Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Jan. 7, 1986, as to
whether section 1157 prohibits a physician-member of a committee from testifying voluntarily as to what occurred at a committee meeting. West Covina II, supra note 179,
- Cal. 3d -, 701 P.2d 1171, 215 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1985). This issue actually presents

two questions: (1) Whether a physician-member can voluntarily testify as to what statements he made and/or records he reviewed; and (2) whether a physician-member can
testify as to what other persons in attendance at the meeting said and what records they
reviewed. The Second Appellate District Court failed to distinguish these issues in West
Covina II. West Covina I, supra note 179, 165 Cal. App. 3d 794, 211 Cal. Rptr. 677
(1985).
202. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
203. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 734, 640 P.2d 115, 123, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 496, 504-05 (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
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The recent case of Brown ex rel. Brown v. Superior Court2°4 provided significant inroads for Elam plaintiffs. In Brown, petitioner
Michelle Brown, through her guardian ad litem Morris Brown,
sought discovery of certain information relevant to the action she
filed against Dr. Robert Grant and West Hills Medical Center for
hospital corporate negligence, fraud and intentional misrepresentation of compliance with JCAH standards. 205 Specifically, Brown
sought to compel the hospital to admit or deny whether it had, in
fact, reviewed Dr. Grant and to produce certain requested
20 6
documents.
The Second Appellate District held that a medical malpractice
plaintiff is entitled to discover whether or not a defendant hospital
evaluated a physician.20 7 The court noted that this information, as
distinguished from a question directed as to whether a particular
patient's care was reviewed by the committee, does not constitute
either "records or proceedings" of a peer review committee.
Of equal importance is the fact that when the Brown court reviewed the discoverability of plaintiff's other requests, it noted that
"[t]he burden of establishing entitlement to nondisclosure [rests]
with the party resisting disclosure, not the party seeking it."208 Specifically, in determining that the trial court may have unnecessarily
restricted some discovery, the court directed the trial court to review the discovery requests with the following standard in mind:
That the request "may include materials generated by hospital
committees" ... is not enough. Hospital, which is resisting discovery in trying to show entitlement to nondisclosure, must sufficiently establish "that an answer cannot be given without
divulging the 'proceedings (or) the records'
'20 9of the medical staff
committees to which section 1157 refers."
Thus, under Brown, a plaintiff may request whether, in fact, a committee evaluated the subject physician, and if so, on what dates the
204. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 489, 214 Cal. Rptr.
266 (1985).
205. Id. at 492, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 268. The complaint specifically alleged that "Dr.
Grant had more than 85 malpractice lawsuits against him. In seven of those cases between 1970 and 1975 Hospital was a codefendant; between 1975 and 1980, Hospital was
a codefendant with Dr. Grant in 22 1/2 percent of all cases... against Hospital." Id. at
492 n.1, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 268 n.1.
206. Id. at 494, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 270. Brown's request for production of documents
included the following: blank medical staff applications; Dr. Grant's reapplications; the
rules, bylaws and regulations of the hospital, and memos, notes, reports and letters
regarding Dr. Grant's professional conduct that had been exchanged between the Board
of Governors and the administration of the hospital. Id.
207. Id. at 501, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 274-75.
208. Id. at 500-01, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (citing Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 627,
115 Cal. Rptr. at 319).
209. Id. at 501, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (quoting ML Diablo, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 348,
204 Cal. Rptr. at 628).
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physician was evaluated. Additionally, plaintiffs should try to ascertain the identity of the committee, the identity of the physicians
involved in the review, as well as what action was taken following
the review, arguing that responses will not "divulge either the proceedings or the records of the committee."
Further, plaintiffs should (1) request those documents concerning
the subject doctor in the committee file, which derive from an independent source, not from the investigation of the committee, and
(2) inquire as to whether the plaintiff's treatment was reviewed by
the records committee. For, although the Brown court held that a
request, as to whether a particular plaintiff's treatment was evaluated, seeks to determine the factual content of a committee meeting
and is, therefore, excluded, 2 10 a recent decision by the First Appellate District has indicated otherwise.
Santa Rosa Memorial Hospitalv. Superior Court2 11 was decided
in November of 1985. In Santa Rosa, Victoria Leary brought an
action as a result of an infection which she allegedly acquired while
in the hospital. 212 Her complaint alleged that the hospital negligently employed and staffed the hospital with incapable employees
and agents whose "carelessness, negligence or lack of ability or
' 213
training caused Leary's injury and damage.
During the deposition of Vicki Vogler, a nurse epidemiologist
and a member of the Infection Control Committee, Vogler refused
to answer eighteen questions; the hospital claimed a blanket immunity from discovery under section 1157.214 The trial court granted
the plaintiff's motion to compel and the appellate court affirmed.
210. Id. at 496-97, 214 Cal. Rptr. 271.
211. Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. App. 3d 711, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 236 (1985).
212. Id. at 715, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 714, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 238. The eighteen questions at issue were:
1. "What has the return rate been on those cards [which physicians are
asked to mail to the hosptial if a patient develops an infection after discharge]
in terms of its effectiveness, if you know?"
2. "Has Victoria Leary's care and treatment ever been reviewed by the
Infection Control Committee?"
3. "In terms of Mrs. Leary, have you ever reviewed her chart?"
4. "Are you aware that Mrs. Leary had a Jackson Pratt drain at the time
that she was hospitalized at Santa Rosa Memorial?"
5. "Are you aware that the Jackson Pratt drain that Mrs. Leary had was
having some difficulty in draining?"
6. "In terms of the national statistic, do you know whether in 1982, that
Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital had a higher percentage rate as far as the Class
One clean wound infections?
7. "Do you know whether Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital in 1982 had a
higher than the national statistical standard for contaminated wound infections?"
8. "In 1978, do you know whether Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital had a
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First, the appellate court reviewed the history and application of
section 1157, noting that while Elam does not justify reduction of
the privilege afforded by section 1157, "neither does the interest of
those needs justify enlargement of
defendant hospitals in frustrating
'215
the protection afforded.
Significantly, the court next observed that information which
does not derive from the investigation of a committee is not rendered immune from discovery "merely because it is placed in the
possession of a medical staff committee or made known to committee members. ' 216 The court arrived at this conclusion by analogizing the peer review privilege to the attorney-client privilege,
observing:
Just as a "'party cannot [under the attorney-client privilege]
conceal a fact merely by revealing it to his lawyer'".., a hospital cannot render its files immune from discovery simply by disclosing them to a medical staff committee. Hospital
administratorscannot, in other words, evade their concurrentduty
to insure the adequacy of medical careprovided patients at their
facility-the duty articulatedin Elam-simply by purportingto
that entire responsibility to medical staff
have delegated
2 17
committees.
The court thus noted that, since the responsibilities of hospital
higher percentage than the national average for the dirty and infected
wounds?"
9. "How about 1982?"
10. "Do you know what type of a unit Mrs. Leary was admitted to in
April of 1982, whether it was a medical unit, a surgical unit, isolation,
whatever?"
11. "Could you tell me whether in connection with Victoria Leary you did
any such tabulation [record of number of patients of a physician with wound
infections] in connection with Dr. Morris in any increased incidents (sic) of
wound infection concerning his patients?"
12. "Do you have any information about how they [Santa Rosa Memorial
and other hospitals] do compare [with respect to wound infections]?"
13. "Do you know how many pseudomonas infections patients acquired in
the hospital at Santa Rosa Memorial in the year 1982?"
14. "Do you know how many patients acquired staff (sic) infections at
Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital during their hospitalization in the year 1982?"
15. "Did you ever undertake to specifically try to ascertain the cause of
any infection involving Victoria Leary?"
16. "Have you ever been asked to write up in any fashion any information
or facts or opinions that you have concerning the source of infection on Victoria Leary?"
17. "Do you know how many times Victoria Leary has been admitted to
Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital in connection with a wound infection?"
18. "Do you know whether Dr. Morris reported Mrs. Leary's infection to
the head nurse of the units that she was discharged from?"
Id. at 716, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
215. Id. at 724, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
216. Id.
217. Id. (emphasis added). "[T]he responsibilities of hospital administrators are independent of those resting with medical staff committees." Id.
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administrators pertaining to in-hospital care are independent of
those resting with medical staff committees, 2 18 "section 1157 does
not shield from discovery administrative activities which, while related to, are independent of the investigative and evaluative activi'2 19
ties of medical staff committees.
The court narrowed the scope of section 1157 further when it
held that a hospital should be required to disclose whether a patient's care has been reviewed, unless the hospital can show that
disclosure of the fact of review would be prejudicial to an interest
protected by section 1157, in that such review would not be undertaken as a matter of course. 220 The court qualified its holding by
noting that if the committee regularly reviews the care of randomly
selected patients, a response would not indicate a dereliction and,
therefore, the mere fact of a committee review would not constitute
22 1
a record or proceeding of that committee.
It is thus apparent that section 1157 is not a complete barrier to
discovery of medical staff records. As indicated in Santa Rosa, it
acts only like a privilege. 222 Therefore, plaintiffs' attorneys must
approach a section 1157 claim of immunity just as they would an
attorney/client or physician/patient objection; forcing the objector
to establish the elements of the privilege. The burden is on the hospital to show entitlement to nondisclosure. 223 "That the request
'may include materials generated by hospital committees' is not
enough. ' 224 As such, at the very least, plaintiffs' attorneys should
request an in camera review by the trial judge of the requested
documents.
Further, peer review records are not the only method of building
a case. Plaintiffs' attorneys, proceeding on a strict Elam cause of
action, should promptly ascertain whether the physician has had his
privileges revoked, or restricted, at another hospital. If the physician has been denied staff privileges elsewhere, or removed from a
medical staff for more than forty-five days, plaintiffs should attempt
to find out whether a defendant hospital has complied with section
805.5 of the California Business and Professions Code. 225 Section
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 724, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
Id. at 726, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
Id. at 729, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
Id.
See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
Id.
225. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 805.5 (West Supp. 1986) provides:
(a) Prior to granting or renewing staff privileges for any physician and
surgeon, clinical psychologist, podiatrist, or dentist, any health facility licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of the Health
and Safety Code, or any health care service plan or medical care foundation,
or the medical staff of any such institution, shall request a report from the
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805.5 provides in part that:
(a) Prior to granting or renewing staff privileges for any physician and surgeon .... any health facility... shall request a
report from the Board of Medical Quality Assurance... to determine if any report has been made pursuant to Section 805 indicating that the applying physician ...has been denied staff
privileges, been removed from a medical staff, or had his staff
privileges restricted as provided in Section 805.226
Thus, California law requires hospitals grantingor renewing staff
privileges to first obtain a copy of any section 805 "Disciplinary
Reports," which concern the subject physician. Section 805 Disciplinary Reports are reports made by the chief executive officer and
the chief of the medical staff, and are required to be filed with the
Board of Medical Quality Assurance [hereinafter referred to as
BMQA], 227 whenever any licensed physician is "denied staff priviBoard of Medical Quality Assurance, the Board of Osteopathic Examiners, or
the Board of Dental Examiners to determine if any report has been made pursuant to Section 805 indicating that the applying physician and surgeon,
clinical psychologist, podiatrist, or dentist has been denied staff privileges,
been removed from a medical staff, or had his staff privileges restricted as
provided in Section 805. The request shall include the name and California
license number of the physician and surgeon, clinical psychologist, podiatrist,
or dentist. Furnishing of a copy of the 805 report shall not cause the 805
report to be a public record.
(b) Upon a request made by an institution described in subdivision (a) or
its medical staff, which is received on or after January 1, 1980, the board shall
furnish a copy of any report made pursuant to Section 805. However, the
board shall not send a copy of a report where the denial, removal, or restriction was imposed solely because of the failure to complete medical records.
In the event that the board fails to advise such institution within 30 working
days following its request for a report required by this section, the institution
may grant or renew staff privileges for the physician and surgeon, clinical
psychologist, podiatrist, or dentist.
(c) Any institution described in subdivision (a) or its medical staff which
violates the provisions of subdivision (a) is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be punished by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more
than one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200).
226. Id.
227. The Board of Medical Quality Assurance [hereinafter cited as BMQA] is an
administrative agency within the State Department of Consumer Affairs. Its focus is to
use the regulatory process to protect the health and safety of the public. The Board has
adopted the following mission statement:
The Board of Medical Quality Assurance, as advocate for the public interest,
shall influence the quality of health care of the people of the State of California, and shall address public policy issues in which it may have significant
impact. The Board shall assure that the licensees under its jurisdiction are
qualified and competent to practice their professions safely and effectively
with accountability to the public through (I) the maintenance of appropriate
entry standards into the profession; (2) the assurance of continuing competence of the licensees; and (3) the reduction of substandard care.
The Board consists of nineteen members (twelve physician and seven public members),
appointed by the Governor to four year terms. The Board is divided into three autonomous divisions. BOARD OF MEDICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE 2 (1982).
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leges, removed from the medical staff of such institution or [has] his
staff privileges... restricted for a total of 45 days in any calendar

year for any medical disciplinary cause or reason. ' 228 If the BMQA.
does not respond within thirty working days, the hospital may grant

or renew staff privileges. Thus, although decisions regarding staff
privileges remain entirely at the discretion of the institution, the law
requires that information from the BMQA regarding disciplinary
reports from other institutions be requested before a final decision is
made. Failure of a hospital to request such information is a misdemeanor. 229 Therefore, if a plaintiff can show that the defendant

hospital failed to request section 805 reports prior to granting or
renewing the defendant physician's privileges, and the defendant
physician had, in fact, had his privileges denied or suspended at
another institution, then the violation of section 805.5 may be negli-

gence per se.230 Further, if the hospital did request and obtain section 805 reports, and a plaintiff can discover the contents of such
228. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 805 (West Supp. 1986) provides:

The chief executive officer and the chief of the medical staff, where one
exists, of any health facility licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with
Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code, or any health care service or
medical care foundation shall report to the agency which issued the license,
certificate or similar authority when any licensed physician and surgeon,
clinical psychologist, podiatrist, or dentist is denied staff privileges, removed
from the medical staff of such institution or if his staff privileges are restricted
for a cumulative total of 45 days in any calendar year for any medical disciplinary cause or reason. Such reports shall be made within 20 working days
following such removal or restriction, shall be certified as true and correct by
the chief executive officer and the chief of the medical staff, where one exists,
and shall contain a statement detailing the nature of the action, its date and all
of the reasons for, and circumstances surrounding, such action. If the removal
or restriction is by resignation or other voluntary action that was requested or
bargained for in lieu of medical disciplinary action, the report shall so state.
The reporting required herein shall not act as a waiver of confidentiality of
medical records and committee reports. The information reported or disclosed shall be kept confidential except as provided in subdivision (c) of Section 800, provided that a copy of the report containing the information
required by this section may be disclosed as required by Section 805.5 with
respect to reports received on or after January 1, 1976. The Board of Medical
Quality Assurance, the Board of Osteopathic Examiners, and the Board of
Dental Examiners shall disclose such reports as required by Section 805.5. A
file containing reports received pursuant to this section shall be maintained by
the agency receiving the reports for a minimum of five years after receipt.
Failure to make a report pursuant to this section shall be a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than
one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200).
229. Id.
230. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1986). Specifically, section 669 states in
relevant part:
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reports, 231 then the plaintiff may be able to show that the hospital
knew, or should have known, of a physician's incompetence.
For other alternatives outside the peer review privilege, plaintiffs
should examine court records to determine how many lawsuits were
filed against the defendant physician and how many times the hos(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which
the statute, ordinance or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property
was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance or
regulation was adopted.
Id.
231. To date, no California appellate decision has confronted the issue of the discoverability of section 805 reports. As set forth supra note 228, section 805 provides that
reports by the chief executive officer and chief of staff to the BMQA "shall be kept
confidential except as provided in subdivision (c) of Section S00." Section 800(c) provides in pertinent part:
(c) The contents of any [BMQA] file which are not public records under
any other provision of law shall be confidential except that it may be reviewed
(1) by the licensee involved or his or her counsel or representative who may
but is not required to submit any additional exculpatory or explanatory statements or other information, which statements or other information must be
included in the file, (2) by any district attorney or representative or investigator therefor who has been assigned to review the activities of a healing arts
licentiate, (3) by any representative of the Attorney General's office or investigator thereof who has been assigned to review the activities of a healing arts
licentiate, or (4) by any investigator of the department * * * or a healing arts
board referred to in this section, who has been assigned to review the activities
of a healing arts licentiate. Such licensee may, but is not required to submit
any additional exculpatory or explanatory statements or other information
which statements or other information must be included in the file.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 800(c) (West Supp. 1986).
The precise issue is, therefore, whether "confidential," as used in sections 800 and
805, means that section 805 reports are privileged, subject to subpoena, and/or otherwise discoverable. An argument can be made that section 805 reports are discoverable
and are subject to subpoena based on an analogy to the language of CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 828, 1698, 2294 & 2355 (West Supp. 1986), which state that certain records
"shall be kept confidential and are not subject to discovery or subpoena." See also CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2392 (West Supp. 1986), which pertains to the Bureau of Medical Statistics, and provides that "[s]uch reports and any data not privileged or confidential under state law shall also be available to the public." Similarly, as used in the
context of privileges, a confidential communication is not synonymous with a privileged
communication. It is merely one element required to be shown in order to prevail on an
attorney/client, physician/patient or psychotherapist/patient privilege.
Nevertheless, section 805 reports may be immune from discovery if: (1) the court
finds that the information cannot be obtained without divulging the proceedings or the
records of a hospital committee responsible for the evaluation of care (CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1986)); (2) the court finds the BMQA to be a "professional
standards review organization" to which section 1157's immunity is applicable (CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1157.5 (West Supp. 1986)); (3) CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040 (West Supp.
1986) official information privilege is found to apply; or (4) the court determines that
the reports are not discoverable public documents pursuant to the California Public
Records Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-60 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986).
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pital was a codefendant. This is clearly evidence of notice on the
part of the hospital.
Additionally, plaintiffs should request a copy of the hospital bylaws, and check to see whether there have been any violations such
as those in the Darling case. With regard to the JCAH standards,
plaintiffs should obtain a copy of the current manual and the manual that was in force at the time of the subject incident. Copies of
all surveys conducted of the hospital by the JCAH should also be
requested. Although no California appellate decision has confronted the issue of whether JCAH reports are discoverable, clearly
section 1157 does not apply inasmuch as the JCAH is not an organized committee of (1) a medical staff in a hospital or (2) a local
232
medical society to which section 1157 refers.
Further, interrogatories should be propounded inquiring into the
average occupancy rate of the hospital for the five years preceding
the subject incident, also asking how many patients were admitted
by the defendant physician during each of those years and what the
total income was to the defendant hospital for the care and treatment of patients whose primary treating physician was the defendant physician. If the physician maintained a high occupancy rate, a
plaintiff may be able to make out a case that the governing body
had no incentive to review the physician's qualifications.
Moreover, if the peer review information is still held privileged by
the court at the trial, then plaintiffs should make a motion in limine
to prohibit the use of such information by the defendant hospital. If
the hospital intends to use the information, plaintiffs should argue
that it must be discoverable prior to trial.
In sum, although the California courts have strictly interpreted
section 1157, there are other ways, albeit difficult, to obtain the evidence to establish hospital corporate liability. Plaintiffs must force
hospitals to prove that they have fulfilled their duty of conducting
peer reviews. This can be done by requesting, and having the court
inspect in camera if need be, the administrative files, by-laws, membership applications, surgical privileges documentation, and reapplications for staff membership, and by digging into the hospital's
compliance with the JCAH standards and the BMQA reporting
procedures.
CONCLUSION

In Elam, California adopted the doctrine of hospital corporate
negligence in order to provide victims with an avenue of relief.
Under this theory, a hospital owes its patients an independent duty
232. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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to exercise reasonable care in selecting and reviewing the competency of its staff physicians. However, the immunity provided by
West Covina and section 1157 to the proceedings and records of
those hospital committees responsible for the selection and review
of physicians has effectively barricaded the very avenue of relief the
judiciary provided in Elam.
The premises underlying peer review protection are unsupported
by empirical evidence. In fact, time has proven the policy underlying section 1157 to be wrong. Staff members' candor and objectivity is impaired by the fact that disgruntled colleagues have access to
the records and proceedings. Further, hospitals are using section
1157 as a subterfuge and the statute contains inherent weaknesses
that must be remedied. Therefore, section 1157 must be either repealed or amended to provide for some measure of discovery in actions based upon a hospital's negligent selection or retention of a
hospital staff member.
Legislative action is justified in that the confidentiality provided
by section 1157 can no longer be viewed as the sole means to enhance quality control in hospitals. Today, the Elam doctrine of
hospital corporate negligence also exists as a method of improving
the quality of health care by providing hospitals with a financial
incentive to insure the competency of hospital staff physicians. By
amendment, section 1157 and Elam will be reconciled so that they
may act in concert to elevate the quality of in-hospital medical practice, thereby protecting and furthering the health care interest of the
patient, rather than shielding a hospital from liability when it has
failed to take measures which would have protected a patient from
unreasonable harm. Indeed, "'[t]he only thing necessary for the
triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.' "233
Lisa R. Rohm*

233. The actual quote is taken from now retired Judge B. Abbott Goldberg's famous

Memorandum of Decision, Gonzales v. Nork, Civ. No. 228566 (Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, Cal. Nov. 27, 1983), in response to the Mercy Hospital medical staff

committee members' knowledge of the more than 60 lawsuits alleging incompetency
against Dr. Nork:
As for the doctors on the Mercy staff, two thoughts keep going through my
mind. The one is from Dr. Jones: "No one told me anything." The other is
from Edmund Burke:
"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do
nothing."
Id. (quoting Edmund Burke).
* I dedicate this publication to my parents, Bev and Joe, whose love, support and
encouragement has inspired me to pursue, and enabled me to achieve, my goals and
dreams.
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